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SATISFACTION OF CASH DEILNDS OF DISSENTING
CREDITORS ON REORGANIZATION BY APPRAISAL
WITHOUT JUDICIAL SALE
IN White v. Coriell,' the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, made a striking contribution to the law applicable to
the rights of dissenting creditors in a corporate reorganization.
The case involved the consent receivership of a leather goods
company and a reorganization plan providing for the transfer
of the corporate assets to a new corporation which was to
assume outstanding tax liabilities and issue (a) 1,000 shares of
no-par common stock to White, owner of the entire stock of the
old corporation, and (b) 9,000 shares of $100 par value cumula-
tive preferred in extinguishment of 80% of the claims of credi-
tors, the remaining 20% to be paid by successively maturing
notes.2 There were no outstanding bonds. A private sale pursuant
New York Law Journal, Dec. 1, 1931, at 1117.
The preferred stock of, the new corporation -was to elect 2 of the
5 directors. Otherwise, control was to be vested in the common stock.
White was retained as president of the new corporation at a maximum
salary of $60,000 a year for the first three years.
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to this plan was approved by the district court. Unsecured credi-
tors holding about 10% of the total claims petitioned to set the
sale aside on the grounds that the plan gave the stockholders
of the old corporation a substantial interest in the new company
without requiring assessments, and made no offer of cash to
creditors.3
Previous cases dealing with corporate reorganizations in which
the problem of the instant case arose have turned upon the fair-
ness of the reorganization plan to the complaining creditor or
investor.4 Had this issue controlled the disposition of the instant
case, in all probability the sale would have been set aside since
stockholders of the old company were allotted a substantial in-
terest in the new corporation without the payment of an assess-
ment r or the purchase of additional stock of the new company,"
although a liquidation of the old company would have destroyed
their equity therein. On the other hand, the result of an adjudica-
tion on this point would have been to permit a minority of
creditors to thwart a reorganization deemed advantageous by
the majority and thus force a judicial sale of the entire prop-
erty. Undoubtedly with this element in mind, the court adopted
a juste milieu whereby the question of the fairness of the re-
organization plan became immaterial. It upheld the creditors'
contention that they could not be forced to accept securities
of a new company in discharge of their claims against an indus-
trial corporation. Yet it did not reverse the decree confirming
the sale, but instead offered the dissenting creditors payment
in cash of pro rata shares of the appraised sum which the assets
of the old company would bring if sold at public sale.7
3 The principal creditors were: United States, $80,000 (taxes); Now
York State, $57,000 (taxes); banks, $440,000 ($250,000 of which wore
secured by a pledge of accounts receivable); merchandise creditors,
$400,000. Dissenters held claims amounting to $102,238.
4 E.g. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co. of New
York, 271 U. S. 445, 46 Sup. Ct. 549 (1926); same case in 28 F. (2d)
177 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany
& Chicago Ry. Co., 174 U. S. 674, 19 Sup. Ct. 827 (1899); Temmor v.
Denver Tramway Co., 18 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); North Amion-
can Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 28 F. (2d) 174 (E. D. Mo. 1920).
5 In the following cases the plan was held fair for the reason that
stockholders were required to pay assessments: Kansas City Terminal
Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co. of New York, supraz note 4; P. R. Walsh
Tie & Timber Company v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 280 Fed. 38 (C. C. A.
8th, 1922).
6 In Temmer v. Denver Tramway Co., supra note 4, the plan was hold
fair because the stockholders were called upon to buy additional stock
in the new company.
7 The fact that White, the sole stockholder, was a key-man in the hand-
bag industry, setting the styles and thus determining the nature of the
raw materials supplied to the entire trade, and that the stability of the
entire industry would be affected by the discontinuance of the company
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It is by no means clear that a court does not have the power
to force a dissenting creditor to participate in a reorganization
plan." Influenced by the frequently quoted dictum in Nrortit ot
Pacific Railway Co. v. Boydo which tempered somewhat the
effect of the "fixed principle" enunciated in that case, some fed-
eral courts have indicated that an offer of cash to dissenting
creditors is not essential to the validity of a reorganization
plan.10 In Phipps v. Chicago, Rock Islu.d & Pacific R.ilway
undoubtedly persuaded the assenting creditors to acquiesce in the plan and
influenced the court as well. See Brief of Appellee White, at '3, 8-10.
Moreover, the assent of a majority of creditors to a reorganization plan
has been held to create a presumption of fairness. Jameson v. Guaranty
Trust Co. of New York, 20 F. (2d) 803 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927); P. R. 'Walsh
Tie & Timber Co. v. Missouri Pacific Ry., s.pra note 5; Swaine, Reorgani-
zation of Corporations: Certain Derelopments of the Last Decade (1927)
27 CoL. L. REv. 901, 920.
8 Mr. James N. Rosenberg has contended that federal courts should and
do have inherent power to compel creditors to participate in reorganiza-
tion plans. Rosenberg, A New Scheme of Reorganization (1917) 17 COL.
L. Rnv. 523; Reorganization-The Next Step (1922) 22 COL. L. Rsv. 14;
Phipps v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. (1924) 24 CoL. L. Ruv.
266. Mr. Robert T. Swaine has asserted the contrary with equal force
and contends that the creditor is entitled to proceed to a judicial sale.
Swaine, Rearganizatiou-The Next Step: A Reply to Mr. James N. Roocn-
berg (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 121; Reorganization of Corporations: Ccrtam
Developments of the Last Decade (1927) 27 COL. L. lEV. 901. See also
Cutcheon, Devices Employed to Obviate the Embarrassmntsd Created by
the Boyd Case, 8 LE TURES ON LEGAL Topics (1931) 35, 70 (in accord with
Mr. Swaine); Cravath, Reorganization of Corporations in Sorm LEGAL
PHASES OF CoRPoRATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (1917)
153, 188-198. Statutes in England and Delaware declare a compromize
or arrangement between a corporation and creditors holding three-fourths
in value of the total claims shall be binding on all the creditors. 8 EDW.
VII, c. 69, § 120 (1908); Del. Laws 1925, p. 272, § 1, p. 275, § 4. Similar
statutes in Ohio and Kentucky apply only to railway and bridge com-
panies. OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 9092-9095; KY. STAT. (Carroll,
1930) c. 32, § 771-a.
9 "This conclusion does not, as claimed, require the impossible and make
it necessary to pay an unsecured creditor in cash as a condition of stock-
holders retaining an interest in the reorganized company. His interest
can be preserved by the issuance, on equitable terms of income bonds or
preferred stock." Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 508, 33
Sup. Ct. 554, 561, 562 (1913).
30 See Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co. of New
York, supra note 4, at 454, 455, 46 Sup. Ct. at 551; P. RI. Walsh Tie &
Timber Co. v. Missouri Pacific Ry., szupra note 5, at 44; Phipps v. Chicago,
Rock Island & Pacific Ry., 284 Fed. 945, 950 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922). But
cf. Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago Rys. Co., 158 Fed. 923 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1907). In Ex parte Moore, 6 F. (2d) 905 (E. D. S. C. 1925), the
court held that, in the absence of authority in the Banking Act, it had
no power to compel creditors to accept securities of a new company. Cf.
Gockstetter v. Williams, 9 F. (2d) 354 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925). Similarly,
it has been held that no authority exists under the Bankruptcy Act to
compel dissenting creditors to accept securities. In re Prudential Out-
19321
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CoYN which was actually decided upon grounds of estoppel, 12
Sanborn, J., said: "It was within the power and the judicial
discretion of the court to adjudge and secure that interest or
share to him or it [unsecured creditors] in the stock, bonds,
or other securities of the reorganized company."'" It is sig-
nificant, however, that Judge Sanborn based his reluctance to
require payment in cash upon the fact, which the device em-
ployed in the instant case obviates, that such a requirement
would result in the dissenting creditor's receiving the ivlwlc
amount of his claim in cash while other creditors received
only a pro rata share of the property.14 Furthermore it may
be that the language in previous cases dealing with this point
was intended to apply only to railroad and not to industrial
reorganizations, for, since railroads cannot be liquidated, a re-
quirement of cash payment to dissenting creditors in railroad
reorganizations is theoretically impossible. Practically, how-
ever, dissenters rarely represent more than a small percentage
of the outstanding indebtedness, and an amount sufficient to dis-
charge their claims is generally provided by assessments paid by
stockholders in return for a distribution to them of the securi-
ties refused by the dissenters.15 Moreover, if the device of the
instant decision be adopted, the probability of raising a sum
sufficient to pay dissenters is increased since their claims are
appraised at the liquidation value of the corporate properties,'
and the securities allotted to them by a fair scheme of reorgani-
zation represent, at a minimum, a corresponding share of that
value. Consequently, it seems that the same considerations with
reference to requiring cash payment are present in railroad
as well as industrial reorganizations, and that the device em-
ployed in the instant case, although it may have forced a sale
of some of the corporate properties by reason of the unusual
fact that no new capital was realized by assessments, is avail-
able in both types of reorganization.
Furthermore, the desirability of this solution seems no less
apparent than its simplicity, even from the dissenter's stand-
point. He has advanced credit to the corporation with a view
fitting Co., 250 Fed. 504 (S. D. N. Y. 1918); In re J. B. & J. M. Cornell
Co., 186 Fed. 859 (S. D. N. Y. 1911); In re Northampton Portland Cement
Co., 185 Fed. 542 (E. D. Pa. 1911). However, minority creditors can be
forced to accept a composition. 30 STAT. 549 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §
30 (b) (1926).
"'Supra note 10.
2 See Rosenberg, Phipps v. Chicago, Rook Island & Pacific Ry. Comn-
pany (1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 266, 270.
13 Phipps v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., supra, note 10, at 950.
14Ibid. at 953. See criticism in Harding v. American Sumatra Tobacco
Company, 14 F. (2d) 1681 169 (N. D. Ga. 1926).
15 Cravath, op. cit. supra note 8, at 182-185.
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to a cash return upon possible liquidation; not to the potential
necessity of investing in the stock of his customer or even in
his notes. If his dissent is based upon a belief that the reor-
ganized corporation will likewise be unsuccessful, he is unwill-
ing to surrender a creditor's share of liquidation proceeds for
a stockholder's share, subordinate to any debts the new corpo-
ration may incur. Nevertheless, he cannot claim more than he
contracted for, that is, an aliquot share of the proceeds of
liquidation, and since such proceeds are determined in the case
of large corporations by judicial determination of an upset
price,16 a creditor cannot complain of a hypothetical in lieu of
an actual judicial sale. This is particularly so since the existence
of a reorganization plan and the presence of a reorganization
committee as purchaser of the corporate properties will increase
the upset price and likewise the amount at which the probable
proceeds of a hypothetical judicial sale are appraised.
From the standpoint of the majority the present device serves
the valuable purpose of eliminating the possibility of avoidance
of the sale at the suit of a minority creditor who may not have
been awarded a fair share in the reorganization, and accordingly
reduces the threat of nuisance strikers. If the theory of the
instant solution were consistently employed it would seem that
the majority are also protected from the threat of the drastic
remedy allowed complaining creditors in the Boyd 17 case and
in Mountain States Power Company v. A. L. Jordau. Lumber
Company.'8 In the latter case, the dissenting creditor was de-
creed a pro rata share of the value of the old corporation's prop-
erties, appraised as a going concern, minus the amount of the
foreclosure decree and of outstanding bonds. Since the value of
the corporate properties as a going concern amounted to almost
four times the upset price which governed the judicial sale to
the reorganization committee, it is evident that a decree based
upon the proceeds of an actual or hypothetical judicial sale would
have been greatly to the advantage of the participants in the
reorganization. The issue in this case and in the Boyd case arose
upon actions by creditors against the new corporation and not,
36 The huge sum usually required precludes competitive bidding, and
the property is purchased by the reorganization committee at approxi-
mately the upset price. Weiner, Conflicting Functions of the Upsct Price
in Corporate Reorganizations (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 132, 138.
17Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, sztpra note 9 (property of new com-
pany subjected to judgment to which old company was liable, although
seven years had elapsed since reorganization).
s286 Fed. 217 (D. Mlont. 1923); 293 Fed. 502 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923),
certiorari denied, 264 U. S. 582, 44 Sup. Ct. 332 (1923). Similar hold-
ings: Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Guardian Trust Co., 240 U. S.
166, 36 Sup. Ct. 334 (1916); Howard v. Mlaxwell Motor Co, 269 Fed.
292 (S. D. N. Y. 1920) (contingent claim).
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as in the principal case, upon appeal from a decree confirming
the sale. Nevertheless, it is inescapable that the device adopted
in the instant case is inharmonious with the theory of prior
adjudications which determine the creditor's rights by the rela-
tive benefits offered him by the reorganization plan, and his
remedy by the value of the corporate property as a going con-
cern.19 The effect of this divergence is accentuated by observ-
ing that while the rights of dissenters have heretofore been
determined irrespective of whether the value of the corporate
properties at judicial sale exceeded the bonded indebtedness,",
in the present device it is clear that the existence of a bonded
indebtedness equal to the appraised proceeds of a judicial sale
would have deprived the dissenting creditors of any relief.
Perhaps because the court in the instant case realized this
radical divergence from the remedies decreed in prior cases
it felt constrained to offer the complaining creditors alternative
relief, namely, payment in cash of the appraised value of the
stock and notes offered them at the time of the reorganization,
It is evident that this option permits the creditors to share in
the increased value of the corporate properties resulting from
their transfer to a new corporation pursuant to the reorganiza-
tion plan while relieving them of its speculative burdens. Such
an outcome is clearly undesirable. If the dissenter is to share
in the benefits of a reorganization, the fairness of the plan should
be adjudicated and he should be required to accept the securi-
ties offered. If he is unwilling to accept securities of the new
corporation, the first alternative offered by the court will give
the dissenter approximately the same amount which he would
have got had the corporate properties been sold for cash. This
device is closely analogbus to the underlying principle of the
appraisal statutes relating to the remedy of stockholders who
oppose a transfer of all corporate assets. 1 While a dissenting
stockholder is entitled to cash payment of the appraised value
of his holdings, he is not allowed to benefit by any appreciation
in such value caused by a transfer in which he refuses to par-
ticipate.22 And there appears no reason why a different rule
should apply to creditors.
'19 See Cutcheon, op. cit. supra note 8, at 45, 46.2 0 North American Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., supra note 4; Cutcheon,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 45, 46. But cf. Hancock v. Toledo, Peoria &
Warsaw R. R., 9 Fed. 738 (N. D. Ill. 1882).
21 Lattin, Remedies, of Dissenting Stockholders under Appraisal Statutes
(1931) 45 HARV. L. REV. 233; Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockhold.
ers (1927) 27 COL. L. Rv. 547. This device has been employed in tho
absence of statute. Tanner v. Lindell Ry., 180 Mo. 1, 79 S. W. 155 (1904).
See DOUGLAS AND SHANKS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATION FINANCI"
(1931) 897-929.22 Matter of Fulton, New York Law Journal, Dec. 11, 1931, at 1332
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DEFENSES OF BANK STOCKHOLDERS TO DOUBLE
LIABILITY
THE unprecedented frequency of bank failures in recent years
following upon the financial depression 1 has centered renewed
attention upon the diverse attempts by bank stockholders to
avoid their statutory double liability.2 For purposes of discus-
sion, the defenses that have been asserted against the imposition
of this liability may be grouped into (1) those which are incident
to a transfer of the stock, and (2) those set up by a stockholder
who is the actual owner and at the same time recorded as such
on the corporation's books.
I
Where a transfer of bank stocks is involved courts have not
hesitated to impose liability upon either an alleged actual owner
who is not the stockholder of record or a stockholder of record
who is not the actual owner. Two recent cases involving converse
situations clearly illustrate this disposition to give broad effect
(New York Court of Appeals); Lattin, op. cit. supra note 21, at 243. In
Jones v. Missouri-Edison Co., 203 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913), dissenting
stockholders were held entitled to the value of their shares as enhanced
by the merger in order that trustees responsible for the transfer might
not profit from their breach of trust.
I In the past four years the number of bank failures has increased
as follows: 1928, 491; 1929, 642; 1930, 1345; 1931 (excluding December),
1932. Federal Reserve Bulletin, December, 1931, pp. 664, 697.
205 additional failures during December, 1931 are unofficially reported,
making a total of 2,137 for that year. 60 BADsTrmET's 93 (Jan. 23, 1932).
n-Double liability statutes have been enacted by the Federal government
and all the states except Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont and Vir-
ginia. The Idaho statute was declared unconstitutional in Fralic]: v.
Guyer, 36 Idaho 648, 213 Pac. 337 (1923). Except for the Colorado stat-
ute, which imposes triple liability (Colo. Laws 1923, c. 07, p. 185), the
state enactments follow generally the wording of the federal statute,
which reads as follows:
"The stockholders of every national banking association shall be held
individually responsible for all contracts, debts, and engagements of such
association, each to the amount of his stock therein, at the par value
thereof in addition to the amount invested in such stock. The stockholders
in any national banking association who shall have transferred their
shares or registered the transfer thereof within sixty days next before
the date of failure of such association to meet its obligations, or with
knowledge of such impending failure, shall be liable to the same extent
as if they had made no such transfer, to the extent that the subsequent
transferee fails to meet such liability; but this provision shall not be con-
strued to affect in any way any recourse which such shareholder might
otherwise have against those in whose names such shares are registered
at the time of such failure." 12 U. S. C. § 64 (1926).
1932]
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to the statutes. In Corker v. Soper,3 the defendant subscribed to
bank stock "as agent" for a corporation which he subsequently
formed solely for the purpose of holding the stock as record
owner. Upon the bank's subsequent insolvency, the court, with-
out questioning the reality of the corporate existence, held that
the corporation was a mere agent of the defendant, who was
thus subject to double liability. In Andrew v. People's State
Bcnk,4 on the other hand, one who became a stockholder of
record solely for the accommodation of the bank and with the
purpose of remaining such only temporarily was nevertheless
held liable on the stock.
When, upon a sale of bank stock, no transfer is made on the
bank's books, the transaction is deemed effective between the
parties and the transferee as the real owner is subject to double
liability.- In addition, statutes make the transferor liable for
a certain period after the transferO although in such event he
is entitled to reimbursement from the transferee., Furthermore,
it is very generally held that the transferor remains liable
even after the statutory period,8 unless he has taken reasonable
precautions to have the transfer recorded. 9 This continuing lia-
bility has been said to rest upon estoppel10 But no actual re-
liance by creditors upon the bank's records is required, 1 nor
is the transferor liable for debts incurred subsequent to the
transfer.2 Moreover, mere knowledge of the transfer by the
bank officials releases the transferor from liability.13 The test
3 53 F. (2d) 190 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931). Accord: Houghton v, Hubbell,
91 Fed. 453 (C. C. A. 1st, 1899).
4 234 N. W. 542 (Iowa 1931).
5 Baker v. Reeves, 85 Fed. 837 (C. C. D. Wash. 1898). See also John-
ston v. Iafflin, 103 U. S. 800 (1880).
6 This period ranges from sixty days to one year. See Federal Statute,
supra note 2; 2 S. D. ComP. LAws (1929) § 8993. In this computation
the day of transfer is excluded. Bank of Dassel v. March, 183 BIlnn.
127, 235 N. W. 914 (1931).
7 Pace v. Shaw, 29 S. W. (2d) 965 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930). The ques-
tion of the transferor's right to exoneration does not seem to have arlen.
8 Karraker v. Ernest, 4 F. (2d) 404 (D. C. 111. 1925) ; Taylor v. Ermen,
183 Ark. 323, 35 S. W. (2d) 1033 (1931); Shaw v. Green, 29 S. W.
(2d) 818 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
9 Whitney v. Butler, 118 U. S. 655, 7 Sup. Ct. 61 (1886); Dellert v.
Stallman, 29 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928); State v. Ware, 82 Okla.
130, 198 Pac. 859 (1921).
10 See Pace v. Shaw, supra note 7; (1930) 43 HARv. L. R.v. 1150.
11 Chapman v. Pettus, 269 S. W. 268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
12 Mobley v. Phinizy, 172 Ga. 339, 157 S. E. 182 (1931); Bank of
Dassel v. March, supra note 6; cf. ,Latimer v. Bennett, 167 Ga. 811, 146
S. E. 762 (1929).
:3 Snyder v. Forster, 73 Fed. 136 (C. C. A. 5th, 1896); Taylor v. Mc-
Kennon, 178 Ark. 223, 10 S. W. (2d) 360 (1928); Darden v. Coward,
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of liability thus would seem to be not estoppel but simply the
negligence of the transferor in remaining the apparent owner
resulting in injury to creditors. It is reasonable to suppose,
however, that the statute is intended to set an absolute limit
to the transferor's liability in the absence of bad faith, even
though he remains the stockholder of record. But such a view
has been adopted in only one jurisdiction. 4
In the absence of consent by the transferee a transfer, even
though recorded, is ineffective to impose double liability upon
him.Y1 Thus a wife who refused, upon her husband's death, to
accept by descent bank stock bought by him as community prop-
erty was not liable thereon.' And a subscriber who had paid
for a specified number of shares of a "proposed increase" of
a bank's capital stock was not subject to an assessment when
the increase never eventuated but instead old stock was trans-
ferred of record by the bank officials without the knowledge
or consent of the subscriber. 7 On the other hand, acquiescence
rendering the record holder liable may be implied by his recog-
nition of the stock's standing in his name, as by acceptance of
a directorate, 8 by signing the stock certificate,"2 or by paying
thereon an assessment which he is now contesting. -0
A stockholder who, in anticipation of the bank's insolvency,
transfers his holdings to a financially irresponsible person re-
mains liable upon the bank's subsequent failure even though
the transfer be recorded.21 But according to the leading federal
197 N. C. 35, 147 S. E. 671 (1929). Contra: Fugua v. Shaw, 29 S. W.
(2d) 319 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
'14Austin v. Gamble, 297 S. W. 806 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Seidel v.
Shaw, 7 S. W. (2d) 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
15 Williams v. Vreeland, 250 U. S. 295, 39 Sup. Ct. 438 (1919); Smith
v. Sogn, 226 N. W. 729 (S. D. 1929).
16Austin v. Strong, 1 S. W. (2d) 872 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928), re-
hearing denied, 3 S. W. (2d) 425 (1928). Where a stockholder refused
to exchange his stock for stock in a merged bank, but instead gave it to
his daughter who effected the exchange, he was not subject to double
liability. Shaw v. Rogers, 36 S. W. (2d) 533 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
7 Stephens v. Follett, 43 Fed. 842 (C. C. D. Blinn. 1890). But ef. Rand
v. Columbia National Bank, 94 Fed. 349 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899). A sub-
scriber to new stock is not liable if the bank fails before the subscription
proceedings are complete. Winters v. Armstrong, 37 Fed. 508 (C. C. D.
Ohio 1889). But he is liable where the proceedings are complete although
he has not received his stock certificate. Pacific National Bank v. Eaton,
141 U. S. 227, 11 Sup. Ct. 984 (1891).
:18 Finn v. Brown, 142 U. S. 56, 12 Sup. Ct. 136 (1891).
'19Kenyon v. Fowler, 155 Fed. 107 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907), aff'd 215 U. S.
593, 30 Sup. Ct. 409 (1910).
20 Rust v. MacLaren, 29 F. (2d) 288 (D. Kan. 1928).
21 Stuart v. Hayden, 169 U. S. 1, 18 Sup. Ct. 274 (1898); Cooley v.
Armstrong, 35 F. (2d) 401 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
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case of McDonald v. Dewey,22 the liability is limited to an amount
sufficient to satisfy prior creditors. This distinction between
prior and subsequent creditors, however, was not adopted by the
only state court which has passed on the question,"3 and would
seem to be without rational support. It is clear that the trans-
feror's liability in this situation is based upon actual fraud on
the creditors, for no liability is held to attach if he is ignorant
of the bank's insolvency and transfers to a financially irresponsi-
ble person,24 or if the bank is in a sound condition and an
actual transfer is made to avoid liability,2 or if a transfer is
made to solvent transferees in anticipation of the bank's in-
solvency.2 And subsequent creditors are prejudiced by the fraud
to the same extent as are prior creditors.
Attempts to impose liability upon a bank holding stock of
another bank are often frustrated by the judicial, and frequently
statutory, limitation placed upon the power of banks legally
to invest in such stock and therefore to assume liability upon
it.27 The rule is clearly to protect the stockholders and creditors
of an investing bank. But its efficacy is somewhat vitiated by
the holding that a bank may accept other bank stock as security
for a loan and upon foreclosure become liable to assessment
thereon. 8 Even in this situation, however, the courts, recog-
nizing the tenuous nature of the distinction, go far in holding
that the creditor bank, even after foreclosure, still holds the
stock merely as collateral and is therefore not liable.1'A pledgee of bank stock, even though holding it of record
"as collateral," is not subject to double liability thereon,30 but, in
22 202 U. S. 510, 26 Sup. Ct. 731 (1906).
23Newton v. Bennett, 159 Ga. 426, 126 S. E. 242 (1924).
24 Earle v. Carson, 188 U. S. 42, 23 Sup. Ct. 254 (1903); Vandargrift
v. Rich Hill Bank, 163 Fed. 823 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908) ; see Fowler v, Crouse,
175 Fed. 646 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910).
25 See Stuart v. Hayden, supra note 21.
26 See McDonald v. Dewey, supra note 22, and Cooley v. Armstrong,
supra note 21. But see Stuart v. Hayden, supra note 21.
27 California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. a62, 17 Sup. Ct. 831 (1897);
Concord First National Bank v. Hawkins, 174 U. S. 364, 19 Sup. Ct. 739
(1899); Veigel v. Dakota Trust & Savings Bank, 225 N. W. 657 (S. D.
1929). That the bank has received benefits from the stock is immaterial.
Shaw v. National German American Bank, 132 Fed. 658 (C. C, A. 8tbh,
1904), aff'd 199 U. S. 603, 26 Sup. Ct. 750 (1905).
28 National Bank v. Case, 99 U. S. 628 (1878); Veigel v. Dakota Trust
& Savings Bank, supra note 27; see First National Bank v. Federal Land
Bank, 177 N. E. 462 (Ind. App. 1931); Cassatt v. First National Bank,
156 Atl. 278 (N. J. L. 1931). Contra: Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Mabry, 136 So. 714 (Fla. 1931).
2 9Robinson v. Southern National Bank, 180 U. S. 295, 21 Sup. Ct. 383
(1901).
ao Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 2 Sup. Ct. 10 (1882); Pauly v.
State Loan & Trust Co., 165 U. S. 606, 17 Sup. Ct. 465 (1897); Anderson
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accord with the underlying principle of liability, he is liable if
the stock stands in his name as owner,3 even though he may
have redelivered the pledge on payment of the loan 3- or subse-
quently colorably transferred it of record to a third person-3
if the latter be irresponsible. The pledgor's liability is unques-
tioned and he cannot by transfer confer such liability upon a
third party who is ignorant of the pledge.3 -
It is settled that an infant is utterly without capacity to bind
himself to double liability and as owner of bank stock can dis-
affirm liability after the bank's failure.3 But to bar what would
otherwise become a simple device to avoid liability, the courts
have ruled that a purchase of bank stock by a parent in the
name of his minor children or an absolute transfer of record
to them does not relieve the parent from liability thereon.30 Nor
is the result altered even if after the assessment but before suit
the infant comes of age and assents to ownership of the stock.T
However, by invoking the statutory immunity to personal lia-
bility of trustees 38 in combination with the non-liability of
children, an effective method of evading the statute seems to
v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 111 U. S. 479, 4 Sup. Ct. 525 (1884);
Williamson v. American Bank, 185 Fed. 66 (C. C. A. 4th, 1911). But the
pledgee is liable as soon as he assumes ownership of the stock, as by
crediting the stock on the pledgor's debt, even though he may not become
the stockholder of record. Ohio Valley National Bank -. Hulitt, 204 U. S.
162, 27 Sup. Ct. 179 (1907).
32Pullman v. Upton, 96 U. S. 328 (1877); National Bank v. Case,
supra, note 28. Contra: Chapman v. Marsico, 270 S. W. 1113 (Tem. Civ.
App. 1925).32 Bowden v. Farmers & Merchants' Bank, Fed. Cas. No. 1714 (C. C. D.
Md. 1877).
33 National Bank v. Case, supra note 28.
3 4Burt v. Richmond, 107 Fed. 387 (D. C. Vt. 1901). Nor can a stock-
holder who is sued for double liability defeat execution on his assets by
their assignment to a prior debtor as security. Masheter v. Carman, 130
Kan. 856, 288 Pac. 543 (1930).
35Mellott v. Love, 152 Miss. 860, 119 So. 913 (1929).
S6Foster v. Chase, 75 Fed. 797 (C. C. D. Vt. 1896) (stock bought in
children's names); Early v. Richardson, 280 U. S. 496, 50 Sup. Ct. 176
(1930) (transfer bona fide to children); Aldrich v. Bingham, 131 Fed.
363 (D. C. N. Y. 1904) (same); Shaw v. McMillan, 24 S. W. (2d) 536
(Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (same).
37Foster v. Wilson, 75 Fed. 797 (C. C. D. Vt. 1896). If, however, stock
is transferred to an infant and he retransfers it to another adult, the
original transferor is thereby relieved of liability from the date of the
first transfer. In re Contract Corporation, (1872) L. R. 8 Ch. 266.
38 By the Federal and most of the state statutes executors, administra-
tors, guardians and trustees are not personally liable but the estate in
their hands is liable to the same extent as the decedent, cestui or ward
would be. See 12 U. S. C. A. (1927) § 66. See also note 40 infra. Cf.
Matteson v. Dent, 176 U. S. 521, 20 Sup. Ct. 419 (1900) (estate of stock-
holder liable if bank fails after his death).
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have been devised. Thus it has been held that no personal lia-
bility would attach where a father is trustee of bank stock
bought by the children's money89 or where a third person is
constituted trustee for the transferor's children. 4 And in the
recent case of McNair v. Darmgh,41 a father who in good faith
and without knowledge of the bank's failing condition trans-
ferred national bank stock to himself as trustee for his minor
children, was held to be thereby relieved of liability. Liability
is thus entirely avoided, for the children's estates are not sub-
ject to assessment on the stock,2 despite the striking analogy
to the liability upon stock of a married woman who is incapable
of contracting.43 While the result may be consistent with a strict
interpretation of the double liability statutes, it hardly accords
with the statutory purpose of protecting creditors or with the
usual judicial diligence in effectuating that purpose and thwart-
ing ready devices of evasion.
II
The defenses of a stockholder of record who is also the actual
owner usually arise out of transactions with the bank or with
goverrnmental banking officials. In this connection it is funda-
mental that double liability is solely for the benefit of creditors,
and that the bank is without power to prejudice these rights.
Thus although the stockholder's purchase was induced by the
fraud of the bank's officers, of which he was ignorant until the
bank's failure, he can neither rescind 44 nor set-off a claim for
39 Fowler v. Gowing, 165 Fed. 891 (C. C. A. 2d, 1908).
40 Corporation Commission v. Latham, 201 N. C. 342, 160 S. E. 205
(1931); Rutledge v. Stackley, 160 S. E. 429 (S. C. 1931). In these cases
the cestuis were not disclosed upon the bank books, the father holding
merely "as trustee," and in the Rutledge case the South Carolina statute
did not specifically relieve trustees of liability. A trustee is liable if the
stock stands in his individual name as owner, even though the bankl knows
it is held in trust. Lewis v. Switz, 74 Fed. 381 (C. C. D. Neb, 1896);
American Trust Co. v. Jenkins, 193 N. C. 761, 138 S. E. 139 (1927).
And a few cases hold that "as trustee" is merely discriptio personao and
is not sufficient to relieve the trustee of personal liability. Flynn v. Ameri-
can Banking and Trust Co., 104 Me. 141, 69 AtI. 771 (1908); Grew v.
Breed, 10 Metc. 569 (Mass. 1846). Contra: Welles v. Larrabee, 36 Fed.
866 (C. C. D. Iowa. 1888); Andrew v. City Commercial Savings Bank,
205 Iowa 42, 217 N. W. 431 (1928).
4121 F. (2d) 906 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929), certiorari denied, 280 U. S. 5063,
50 Sup. Ct. 14 (1929).
42 Rutledge v. Stackley, sup'a note 40. Cf. Foster v. Lincoln, 74 Fed.
382 (C. C. D. Vt. 1896), aff'd 79 Fed. 481 (C. C. A. 2d, 1897); Clark v.
Ogilvie, 111 Ky. 181, 63 S. W. 429 (1901).
3 Keyser v. Hitz, 133 U. S. 138, 10 Sup. Ct. 290 (1890); Christopher v.
Norvell, 201 U. S. 216, 26 Sup. Ct. 502 (1906).
4 Scott v. Deweese, 181 U. S. 202, 21 Sup. Ct. 585 (1901); Anderson
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damages for thd fraud against his double liability.'s Even
though he rescinded prior to insolvency, he is liable as a trans-
feror if such rescission were made within the statutory period
of a transferor's liability after the transfer." And the bank
cannot by contract 47 or by the device of reducing its capital
stock 48 release the stockholder from full liability. It seems also
that the receiver's negligence in buying or collecting the assess-
ment cannot affect the creditor's rights to a full payment of
the double liability.4 9
The test of a stockholder's right to set off the payment of a
prior assessment on his stock seems to depend upon the pur-
pose and use of such a payment, that is, whether it be for the
operation of the bank or for the benefit of creditors in liquida-
tion proceedings. Thus payment of an assessment to enable
the bank to restore impaired capital,5,1 or to eliminate objection-
able notes from its assets,5'1 or to reopen cannot be set off
v. Cronkleton, 32 F. (2d) 170 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); Williams -. Stone,
25 F. (2d) 831 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928); Baird v. Anderson, 60 N. D. 444,
235 N. W. 150 (1931).
The fact that the stock was issued ultra -ires is, of course, always a de-
fense to double liability. Randall v. Mickle, 138 So. 14 (Fla. 1931).
4
- Lantry v. Wallace, 182 U. S. 536, 21 Sup. Ct. 878 (1901); Dyar v.
Mobley, 170 Ga. 65, 152 S. E. 74 (1930). Such set-off is not even allowed
against creditors prior to the purchase of the stock. Hawkins -. Swan,
52 F. (2d) 688 (N. D. W. Va. 1931). Contra: Smith v. Bradshaw, 54
S. D. 158, 222 N. W. 683 (1928) (bank examiner's deceit was also
inducement to purchase).
"Wehby v. Spurway, 30 Ariz. 274, 246 Pac. 759 (1926), certiorari
denied, 273 U. S. 722, 47 Sup. Ct. 112 (1926). A correlative holding is
that a purchaser with a right to rescind at the end of a year is liable
to assessment. Winsett v. Spurway, 30 Ariz. 287, 246 Pac. 763 (1926),
certiorari denied 273 U. S. 722, 47 Sup. Ct. 112 (1926).
47 Scott v. Latimer, 89 Fed. 843 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898), certiorari denied,
172 U. S. 649, 19 Sup. Ct. 886 (1899).
48Dane v. Young, 61 Ale. 160 (1872); Mitchell v. Banking Corporation
of Montana, 83 Mont. 581, 273 Pac. 1055 (1929). But a bona fide reduc-
tion -will give immunity to the amount of the reduction, and such reduc-
tion is not a "transfer" subjecting the stockholder to liability foi the
statutory period thereafter. Shaw v. Noyes, 13 S. W. (2d) 443 (Te.
Civ. App. 1929).
49Beckham v. Hague, 38 Misc. 606, 78 N. Y. Supp. 79 (1902). The
statute of limitations does not start to run on the claim until a judicial
determination of the insufficiency of the assets. Denny v. Kennedy, 229
Ky. 178, 16 S. W. (2d) 1030 (1929); Kennedy v. Denny, 237 Ky. 649,
36 S. W. (2d) 41 (1931).
so Delano v. Butler, 118 U. S. 634, 7 Sup. Ct. 39 (1386) ; Russ v. Golson,
136 So. 506 (Fla. 1931); Leach v. Arthur Savings Bank, 203 Iowa 1052,
213 N. W. 772 (1927); Citizens Bank v. Needham, 120 Kans. 523, 244
Pac. 7 (1926).
51 Smith v. Goldsmith, 50 S. D. 1, 207 N. W. 977 (1926).
Huff v. Page, 2 F. (2d) 544 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924), writ of error dis-
missed, 270 U. S. 671, 46 Sup. Ct. 470 (1926); Baird v. Eidsvig, 59 N.
1932]
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against double liability, even when the state bAnk commissioner
acted ultra vires in levying the prior assessment 11 or the bank
officers defrauded the stockholder into paying it." On the other
hand an assessment originally designed to replace impaired capi-
tal but actually used in liquidation may be set off against double
liability,"5 and conversely property delivered to a receiver ex-
pressly to be credited upon any subsequent levy must be so
credited even though wrongfully diverted to other uses by the
receiver. Finally where a payment is made under a trust agree-
ment, either with the bank commissioner " or with bank of-
ficials -5 to be used in the discretion of the trustee for the con-
tinued operation of the bank but in any event to be credited
against double liability upon its failure, the set-off is available
only if the payments were actually retained and applied in
liquidation. This principle was early indicated by a federal
court holding that, where a stockholder delivered securities to
a bank in a financial stringency with the understanding that if
the bank were saved the securities would be returned while if
it failed the avails would be applied upon her double liability,
such application could not be allowed upon the happening of
the latter contingency when the securities had already been
utilized for bank purposes."
As to other claims a stockholder is generally allowed no pref-
erence over creditors by a set-off against double liability. He
is allowed an equal position with them, however, and may there-
fore have an equitable set-off when sued by an individual credi-
tor.61 Following the same distinction, where by statute the
D. 484, 230 N. W. 721 (1930); Baird v. Mall, 232 N. W. 47 (S. D. 1930).
It is immaterial that the assessment ig compulsory. Broadbent v. Me-
Ferson, 80 Colo. 264, 250 Pac. 852 (1926); Blackert v. Lankford, 74
Okla. 61, 176 Pac. 532 (1918).
r3 Duke v. Force, 120 Wash. 599, 208 Pac. 67 (1922).
54 Page v. Jones, 7 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
55 Mosler Safe Co. v. Guardian Trust Co., 208 N. Y. 524, 101 N. E.
786 (1913). See also Korbly v. Springfield Institute for Savings, 245 U.
S. 330, 38 Sup. Ct. 88 (1917).
56 Cole v. Adams, 101 Neb. 21, 161 N. W. 1036 (1917).
57 Andrews v. State, 178 N. E. 581 (Ohio, 1931); cf. Austin v. Hough,
10 S. W. (2d) 655 (Mo. App. 1928).
58 Reed v. Mobley, 172 Ga. 116, 157 S. E. 321 (1931); Andrew v.
Farmers' State Bank, 236 N. W. 392 (Iowa 1931); Minnesota State Bank
of Amboy v. Tabbott, 238 N. W. 53 (Minn. 1931).
59 Sowles v. Witters, 39 Fed. 403 (C. C. D. Vt. 1889).
60 Farmers' State Bank v. Reed, 114 Kan. 216, 217 Pae. 320 (1923);
Reimers v. Larson, 52 N. D. 297, 202 N. W. 653 (1925); of. Sawyer v.
Hoag, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 610 (1873).
63 Pierce v. Topeka Commercial Security Co., 60 Kan. 164, 55 Pae. 853
(1899); Broadway National Bank v. Baker, 176 Mass, 294, 57 N. E. 603
(1900); Strauss v. Denny, 95 Md. 690, 53 Atl. 571 (1902). Federal courts,
prior to the allowance of an equitable defence in an action at law [28
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double liability is to be enforced by the receiver or trustee in
insolvency in favor of creditors generally, payments made by
a stockholder to an individual creditor may not be set off against
his double liability, 2 but where the statutory liability is in favor
of individual creditors, the set-off is proper,03 even though the
creditor paid was a corporation in which the bank stockholder
owned stock.-
Bank stock acquired before the statutory imposition of double
liability is not subject thereto, although subsequent to the statute
the articles of incorporation were amended so as to increase the
capital stock.63 Constitutional objections of impairment of the
obligation of contract and deprivation of property without due
process of law might well be used to achieve this result. But
if the holder of such stock consents to the statute by paying
one assessment, he is subject to future assessments. 0
As the legislatures and courts go to more extreme lengths in
assessing bank stockholders for the benefit of creditors,67 an
inquiry as to the desirability and efficacy of double liability seems
pertinent. Stockholders in other corporations, even of those
assuming fiduciary aspects such as insurance companies, are not
subject to added liability. A stockholder in these corporations
may even rescind after insolvency for fraud inducing his pur-
U. S. C. § 398 (1926)] refused to allow the set off upon that basis. Crissey
v. Morrill, 125 Fed. 878 (C. C. A. Sth, 1903).
02 Swicord v. Crawford, 148 Ga. 719, 98 S. E. 343 (1919).
C3 Sargent v. Stetson, 181 Blass. 371, 63 N. E. 929 (1902); Garrison v.
Howe, 17 N. Y. 458 (1858).
r 4 Sedgwick City Bank v. Sedgwick Milling & Elevator Co., 59 Ran. 054,
54 Pac. 681 (1898).
6 Dagg v. Hammons, 34 Ariz. 445, 272 Pac. 643 (1928); Hammons v.
Crozier, 297 Pac. 567 (Cal. App. 1931).
First State Bank v. Granville, 237 N. W. 708 (N. D. 1931). A stock-
holder who buys stock in violation of the requirements of the banking
commissioner is subject to liability if before or after the bank's insolvency
the commissioner ratifies the sale. Citizens' State Bank v. Burner, 131
Kan. 286, 291 Pac. 739 (1930).
7A recent Georgia statute authorizing the state bank superintendent to
issue executions against stockholders who after notice neglect to pay their
assessments and making such executions liens on their property from the
date of issuance but providing for resort to the courts was upheld. Coffin
Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U. S. 29, 48 Sup. Ct. 422 (1928). Under this statute
necessity for an assessment at any time need not be shown. Mathers v.
Citizens' Banking Co., 43 Ga. App. 260, 158 S. E. 455 (1931). Immediately
upon taking control of the bank, the banking commissioners may collect
the full amount of the superadded liability, but stockholders are entitled
to a refund of any unused portion. Schwenker v. Bekkendal, 236 N. W.
581 (Wis. 1931). At one time it was held that directors without the stock-
holders' consent could not be authorized by statute to levy assessments.
Duke v. Force, supra note 53. But subsequent statutes authorizing such
action have not been questioned. First State Bank v. Cox, 237 N. W. 708
(N. D. 1931).
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chase and thereby evade the unpaid portion of his subscription
price.68 The provision, moreover, directly contravenes the theory
of distribution of loss which is considered so beneficent in other
fields. The relatively small benefit to numerous creditors de-
rived from the double liability payment " would not seem to
offset the heavy loss devolving upon the stockholder and it can-
not be unequivocally said that the stockholder is more able to
stand the loss than the creditor. And since the stockholders are
usually far removed from the intricacies of banking practice,
the imposition of liability as a practical matter probably does
not conduce to a safer banking course of business. A combina-
tion of a sense of responsibility of banking officials, of a fear of
loss of their investment by stockholders, and of modern state
control seems to furnish sufficient deterrent to speculative prac-
tices. Moreover, the imposition of too heavy liability may cur-
tail necessary investments in bank stock which would offset any
benefits arising from inducements of deposits by double liability
protection. It seems, therefore, that legislatures and courts
might reconsider the rights of bank stockholders. An indication
of such a change of attitude may be seen in the decision of the
California Court7° that a statute permitting the state bank
superintendent to assess bank stockholders without limit for
the benefit of creditors in liquidation was unconstitutional.
68 Hollander v. Heaslip, 222 Fed. 808 (C. C. A. 5th, 1915); 1 Coo01,
CORPORATIONS. (8th ed. 1923) 547, n. 1; cf. McMahon v. Macy, 51 N. Y. 155
(1872); Johnstone v. Black, 59 Wash. 144, 109 Pac. 367 (1910) (pledgee
appearing upon corporation's books as absolute owner hold not liable for
unpaid subscription price).
69 The capitalization of national banks is according to population and
not to liabilities. The capital must be $100,000 except that national banks
in cities with a population of not over 3000 need have only $25,000 capital,
in cities of not over 6000 must have only $50,000 and in cities of over
50,000 must have $200,000. 12 U. S. C. § 51 (1926).
The capital stock of even the very strong banks rarely exceeds in value
over 10% of the total liabilities. Thus as of Dec. 31, 1931, the Continental
Illinois Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, Illinois, with total liabilities of
$1,008,463,768.31 including deposits of $773,437,524.72 has $75,000,000.00
capital stock; the Bank of Manhattan Trust Co. of New York City with
total liabilities of $461,087,089.32 including deposits of $375,131,667.09 has a
capital stock of $22,250,000.00. The National City Bank of Now York with
total liabilities of $1,857,975,421.34 including deposits of $1,418,702,859.54
has a capital stock of $124,000,000.00; the Chase National Bank of the
City of New York with total liabilities of $1,988,669,180.01 including
deposits of $1,459,114,886.43 has a capital stock of $148,000,000.00. 134
COMMRCIAL & FiNANCIAL CHRONICAL (Jan. 9, 1932) pp. xi, xxi, xxvii,
xxix.
10 Wood v. Hamaguchi, 277 Pac. 113 (Cal. 1929).
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RECOVERY OF FOREIGN ASSETS OF LNSOLVENTS
UNDER existing systems for the administration of estates of
insolvent persons or corporations, the rules and practice with
respect to the disposition of assets lying outside the primary
jurisdiction present many inconsistencies. The explanation for
this situation lies largely in the distinctive legal doctrines which
have attached themselves to the various types of assignments
and receiverships and which by their very variety tend to ob-
scure a practical common problem, namely, the efficient adminis-
tiation of all the assets, local and foreign. It is proposed in
th-se comments * to accept the thesis that from a business stand-
point unified control of administration is generally desirable
and, in the light of it, to examine comparatively the powers with
respect to foreign assets exercised by the following-assignees
for the benefit of creditors, assignees and receivers under state
insolvency and winding-up statutes, equity receivers deriving
their powers from the appointing court and receivers and trus-
tees under the National Bankruptcy Act.' In all the situations
considered it is to be assumed that the powers which the assignee,
receiver or trustee is attempting to exercise have been validly
acquired under the law of the primary jurisdiction,2 that is to
say, the place of the original assignment or appointment.
I. Direct Proceedings in Foreign Courts
A. When adverse claims are not involved. The simplest test
of the extraterritorial effectiveness of an assignee or receiver
occurs when he sues in a foreign court on a right of action
formerly in the insolvent or asks the aid of the court in obtain-
ing possession of property in the state, no adverse claims of
third parties being involved.
Under the general rule that a voluntary transfer by the owner
for a valuable consideration, if valid where made, should be
given effect everywhere 3 the standing of an assignee under an
assignment for the benefit of creditors is rarely disputed under
* The second of these comments, on Collction andl Transfer of Assets
by Ancilary Receivers, will be published in the Mlarch issue of the
Journal.
130 STAT. 544 (1898) as amended, 11 U. S. C. §§ 1-112 (1926).
2 Only cases in which action is sought outside the state of the original
assignment or appointment are considered. Problems arising in connec-
tion with proceedings brought within the same state but outside the juris-
diction of the court under which authority is first acquired are not in-
volved.
3See Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 129, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 270 (1890) ;
Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, 173 U. S. 624, 628, 19 Sup. Ct. 545, 546 (1899) ;
BuRRiLL, ASSIGNMENTS (6th ed. 1894) § 275.
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such circumstances. 4 However, statements to the effect that a
foreign assignment contrary to the public policy of the forum
-need not be recognized frequently appear in the opinions," and
in the exceptional case, by what must be considered an improper
application of this doctrine, the assignee has been prevented
from enforcing a contract right against a resident of the state
where suit is brought.6 An assignment made by a debtor in-
voluntarily, under an insolvency statute, for example, is gen-
erally said to have no legal operation in anothei; jurisdiction.7
Theoretically, therefore, a court may always refuse to recognize
the foreign assignee. The practice, however, is more liberal and
he is allowed to sue, as it said, "by comity." 8
The extraterritorial authority of the receiver or other official
vested with the rights of action of an insolvent corporation by
force of a statute of the incorporating state has been rested
on a stronger ground. In the familiar example of an action to
enforce stockholders' liability, it has been held that the receiver
so entitled may sue as of right, there being no leeway for the
doctrine of comity., In these cases the full faith and credit
4Salyer v. Blessing, 151 Ky. 459, 152 S. W. 275 (1913). See
cases cited infra note 29, in which the right to sue is upheld even
when adverse claims are asserted against the assignee. Where common
law objections to the assignment of choses in action have not been over-
come, he may not be permitted to sue. Orr v. Amory, 11 Mass. 25 (1814);
ANSON, CONTRACTS (5th ed. Corbin 1930) § 305.
5 See Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, supra note 3, at 628, 19 Sup. Ct. at
576; Means v. Hapgood, 19 Pick. 105, 106 (Mass. 1837); Birdseye v.
Underhill, 82 Ga. 142, 147, 7 S. E. 863, 865 (1888); In ro Paige Lumber
Co., 31 Minn. 136, 138, 16 N. W. 700, 701 (1883).
6 Ayers v. Des Portes, 56 S. C. 544, 35 S. E. 218 (1900) (assignment
with preferences not permitted by state assignment statute; assignment
made in New* York where preference are permitted held contrary to
public policy of the forum). Contra: Barnett v. Kinney, 147 U. S. 476,
13 Sup. Ct. 403 (1893) (assignment law of forum forbidding preferences
held not to apply to foreign assignments).
7 See note 38 infra. BURRILL, op. cit. supra note 3, § 276.
8 In re Waite, 99 N. Y. 433, 2 N. E. 440 (1885); Van Kempen v.
Latham, 195 N. C. 389, 142 S. E. 322 (1928). Contra: Barth v. Iroquohl
Furnace Co., 63 Ill. App. 323 (1896) (the objection made is procedural,
on. the ground that the le, fori does not -permit the assignee of a chose
in action to sue in his own name).
9 Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415 (1912); Good
v. Derr, 46 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931). In reaching the same result
the doctrine of comity is sometimes relied on. Cole v. Sassenberg, 230 N.
W. 22 (S. D. 1930); Parker v. Stoughton, 91 Wis. 174, 64 N. W. 751
(1895). But cf. Van Tuyl Jr. v. Carpenter, 135 Tenn. 629, 188 S. W.
234 (1916) (statute of state of incorporation did not clearly vest title
in bank superintendent taking over affairs of insolvent bank). The con-
stitutional questions under the full faith and credit clauses are discussed




clause may be invoked,1o and objections on the score of public
policy in the state where suit is brought are met by the state-
ment that provisions imposing stockholders' liability are within
the regulatory powers of the state creating the corporation and
that no other state can properly have a public policy thereon.1 '
But in construing the powers of a receiver, the courts are bound
by the construction of the statute adopted in the enacting state,22
and if the receiver is thereby regarded as having less than titular
powers, he is subject to the disabilities of the ordinary chancery
receiver.
The leading authority for the proposition that a chancery
receiver is not entitled, even by comity, to sue outside the juris-
diction of the appointing court is Booth v. Cl0rk.23 So often has
the case been cited as authority for this proposition that the
particular fact situation has rarely been examined. As a matter
of fact the position of the receiver in that case was extremely
weak; not only had he been guilty of inexcusable lachcs, follow-
ing his appointment on a creditor's bill for the benefit of a par-
ticular creditor only, but the fund sought was contested by other
claimants. But although the issue as stated by the court was
carefully phrased with reference to these facts,'1 the rejection
of the suit has served as a controlling precedent in the federal
courts. 5 The doctrinal objection to entertaining the suit of the
foreign receiver, recognized in Booth v. Clark and relied upon
in the subsequent cases, is that the receiver is merely the crea-
ture of the appointing, court and has therefore no authority
outside of its jurisdiction. In the state courts, however, the
receiver is generally permitted to sue ' in the absence of ad-
10 Converse v. Hamilton, Good v. Derr, both supra note 9.
3 Converse v. Hamilton, supra note 9, at 260, 32 Sup. Ct. at 419.
12 Sterrett v. Second National Bank, 246 Fed. 753 (C. C. A. 0th, 1917).
1 17 How. 322 (U. S. 1854).14 
"As an officer of a court of chancery, for a particular purpose, will
he be recognized as such by a foreign judicial tribunal and be allowed
to take from the latter a fund belonging to the debtor, for its application
to the payment of a particular creditor within the jurisdiction of the
receiver's appointment, there being other creditors in the jurisdiction in
which he now sues, contesting his right to do so?" Ibid. 330. For an
excellent discussion of the proper limitation of the holding in this case, see
Parsons v. Charter Oak Insurance Co., 31 Fed. 305, 307 (C. C. S. D. Iowa
1887).15 Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56, 23 Sup. Ct. 244 (1902); Sterrett v.
Second National Bank, supra note 12; Great Western Mining Co. v. Harris,
198 U. S. 561, 25 Sup. Ct. 770 (1905). Cf. Lewis v. American Naval Stores
Co., 119 Fed. 391 (C. C. E. D. La. 1902) (predicting more liberal rule).
- Hardee v. 'Wilson, 129 Tenn. 511, 167 S. W. 475 (1914); Union
Guardian Trust Co. v. Broadway National Bank, 138 Misc. 16, 245 N. Y.
Supp. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1930). See Toronto General Trust Co. v. Chicago B.
& Q. Ry., 123 N. Y. 37, 47, 25 N. E. 198, 201 (1890). Contra: Booker v.
Ennis, 86 Pa. Super. Ct. 145 (1926) (action to recover overpayment on
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verse claims. And in New York the application of a foreign
receiver for the appointment of an ancillary receiver for no
apparent reason except to recover the property of the debtor
has been refused as useless and necessitating needless expense."
Whether a receiver under the National Bankruptcy Act may
sue even in the district of his appointment has been a disputed
question in the federal courts.'8 And whether, having been
authorized by the appointing court to sue outside the state, he
will be recognized by a federal court in another state is a ques-
tion which has apparently seldom arisen in cases not involving
adverse property claims, but when the court looks to the tradi-
tional limitations upon the powers of a receiver the suit will
not be entertained.", However, the receiver's authority properly
granted by a federal court having jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
proceedings is apparently secure from attack when he sues in
a state court.20 There remains the trustee under the Bankruptcy
Act who is vested by federal statute with the title and powers
of the bankrupt as well as with additional rights, 1 and whose
a claim presented in the receivership).
17 Mabon v. Ougley Electric Co., 156 N. Y. 196, 50 N. E. 805 (1895).
And all needful remedies are available to the receiver in reducing the
property to possession. Also an action for the conversion of the assets.
See ibid. 201, 50 N. E. at 806.
is Permission to sue refused: Boonville National Bank v. Blakey, 107
Fed. 891 (C. C. A. 7th, 1901) (suit to set aside preferential payments);
Bingaman v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 1 F. (2d) 505 (D. Pa. 1924). The
last case indicates that a distinction might be-made under circumstances
indicating danger to the property. See also In re Fixen & Co., 96 Fed.
748, 753 (S. D. Cal. 1899). A federal bankruptcy receiver has succeeded
in suits brought in state courts. McGlue v. Louden, 251 Mass. 173, 146 N.
E. 255 (1925); Muller v. Schram, 100 N. J. Eq. 143, 134 Atl. 657 (1920).
See GILBERT'S COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (2d ed. 1931) 52; 5 REMINGTON,
BANKRuPTCY (3d ed. 1923) § 2221; Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 462.
19 In re Benedict, 140 Fed. 55 (E. D. Wis. 1905). Of. In re National
Mercantile Agency, 128 Fed. 639 (D. Pa. 1904) (order of appointilg
court did not authorize suits outside of the jurisdiction). In re Schrom,
9,7 Fed. 760 (N. D. Iowa 1899) (appointing court refused order to author-
ize suit on ground that there had not yet been an adjudication of bank-
xuptcy.) See REMIANGTON, op. cit. supra, note 18, §§ 2211, 2212. The Amend-
3nent of 1910 provides that the federal courts shall have jurisdiction to
exercise ancillary jurisdiction in aid of a receiver or trustee appointed
in bankruptcy proceedings. 36 STAT. 1838, § 2 (1910), 11 U. S. C., §
11 (20). The effect of the Amendment on the authority of the receiver
in another jurisdiction is discussed by Wollman, Analysis of Bankmrptay
Conditions (1925) 1 A. B. REV. 336; Rhone, ibid. 368; Wollman, ibid, 369;
Joslyn (1926) 2 A. B. REv. 4.
20 Slaughter v. Louisville, 125 Tenn. 292, 143 S. W. 603 (1911) (negli-
gence action); Greenhall v. Hurwitz, 80 Misc. 186, 141 N. Y. Supp. 914
(City Court, N. Y. C. 1913).
21 National Bankruptcy Act, supra note 1, § 67 (b) (c) (e) and (f),
§ 70 (a) (e); 11 U. S. C. § 107 (b) (c) (e) (f), § 110 (a) (e); IEimUG-
-TON, op. cit. supra note 18, §§ 1402, 1403, 2212.
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authority to sue upon them in any appropriate jurisdiction is
conclusively established.?
B. Where property in. the foreign state is advcrscly clcbicd.
The disposition to challenge the very appearance in court of a
foreign assignee or receiver has its basis in deep-seated habits
of authority and protection. It persists, not so much because
of its various doctrinal justifications, as because it represents
a convenient way of parrying at arm's length threats to jealously
regarded local interests such as the control of methods of trans-
ferring title to property, particularly real property, situated
within the state. But of primary concern is the protection of
residents of the forum against injury anticipated from allowing
to be placed beyond their reach assets which represent security
for the payment of debts owed to them. The treatment of the
adverse claims to property lying outside the primary jurisdiction
constitutes the fundamental difficulty in the problem of secur-
ing unity of administration.
Although, as has been noted, a distinction has generally been
acknowledged between voluntary and involuntary assignments,
the diviaing line between the two types is sometimes difficult
to find.23 The common law right of general assignment may be
regulated by statute without losing its distinctive voluntary
character.24 When the assignment is made pursuant to the terms
of a statute, however, it is not alone the character of the act of
the debtor which is looked to in determining whether the tiransfer
is voluntary or involuntary. If the statute offers the debtor a
complete discharge, the assignment is regarded as involuntary
-the coercive effect upon the creditors being sufficient to thlow
it into this category, whether the debtor acted voluntarily or
otherwise.5 Even with the National Bankruptcy Act in force,
and state insolvency statutes suspended to the eoxtent to which
they are conflicting,26 these distinctions, on whatever theory sup-
ported, are of practical importance since general assignments
22 GiLBERT's COLLIER, supra note 18, at 508, 523.
2a For discussion of the distinction generally, see Security Trust Co. v.
Dodd, supra note 3; Sunderland, Volattay Assignments for Bezefit of
Creditors (1903) 2 MICH. L. REv. 112. The court of the sith determines
whether the assignment is voluntary or involuntary. Zacher v. FideIty
Trust Co., 106 Fed. 593 (C. C. A. 6th, 1901).
Mayfield Woolen Mills v. Goodrich Co., 189 Wis. 406, 207 N. W. 954
(1926).
25 Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, supra note 3; Barth v. Backus, 140 N.
Y. 230, 35 N. E. 425 (1893); Segnitz v. Garden City Trust Co., 107 Wis.
171, 83 N. W. 327 (1900). See next comment in this issue.2r GImER's CoLLER, supra note 18, at 7; SMiTH, EquITABLE REMEDIES
OF CRBIpoRS (1899) § 412.
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are not only still possible but are frequently resorted to.21
Once the voluntary or involuntary character of the assignment
is determined, little clue to the results can be found in the doc-
trinal explanation of the differences between them. A fair con-
densation of the language used is that a voluntary assignment
passes the title of property wherever situated and will be re-
spected unless it conflicts with public policy or the rights of
local creditors, whereas an involuntary transfer operates only
upon property within the jurisdiction and in other states has
only such effect as the laws of those states permit, in general
yielding to the rights of local creditors.2s Obviously such a
distinction is verbalistic, and one of approach. Neither assign-
ment can of itself "operate upon" property situated within or
without the state and its effectiveness is only what is given to
it by a court when passing upon a claimant's rights.
In the case of a voluntary assignment the assignee will usually
succeed even against attaching creditors.20 But the grounds on
which the local court may refuse to extend its comity are many.
It may be because the assignment is of a type deemed contrary
to the public policy of the forum,30 or because it does not comply
with some technical requirement of the local assignment stat-
27 Hagar, General Assignments and the Bankruptcy Law (1917) 27
YALE L. J. 210; SMITH, op. cit. supra note 26, § 417 (b). The assignment
may, however, lead to different results since the making of a general
assignment now constitutes an act of bankruptcy. BANXRUPTCY ACT, oupra
note 1, § 3 (4), 11 U. S. C. § 21a (4).
28 See particularly Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, smpra note 3, at 628,
629, 19 Sup. Ct. at 546; STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (7th ad. 1872) §
404, 411.
29 A voluntary assignment is effective as to personal property in an-
other state. As against creditors who are not residents of that state:
Barnett v. Kinney, supra note 6 (local assignment statute applicable
only to assignment made within the state); Ward v. Connecticut Pipe
'Mfg. Co., 71 Conn. 345, 41 Atl. 1057 (1889); J. Walter Thompson Co, v.
-vWhitehed, 185 Ill. 454, 56 N. E. 1106 (1900). As against resident creditors:
.Law v. Mills, 18 Pa. St. 185 (1851) ; Hanford v. Paine, 32 Vt. 442 (1860);
In re Paige Lumber Co., supra note 5; BURRiLL, op. cit. supra note 3, § 275.
The same rule has been held to apply equally to real property. As
.against non-resident creditors: Memphis Savings Bank v. Houchons, 115
Fed. 96 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902); Bloomingdale v. Weil, 29 Wash. 611, 70
iPac. 94 (1902). Also against resident creditors: Stowe v. Belfast Savings
Bank, 92 Fed. 90 (C. C, D. Me. 1897), aff'd 92 Fed. 100 (C. C. A. 1st,
1899). The following maintain a distinction between personal and real
-property as affected by foreign assignments: Loving v. Pairo, 10 Iowa
282 (1859); Watson v. Holden, 58 Kan. 657, 50 Pac. 883 (1897). See
BURRIIL, op. cit. supra note 3, § 277, to the effect that the general rule
-of comity does not apply to real estate.
30 Blake v. Williams, 6 Pick. 296 (Mass. 1828); King v. Johnson, 5
Harr. 31 (Del. 1848); Strickler & Co. v. Tinkham, 35 Ga. 176 (1866);
Loving v. Pairo, supra note 29; Ayers v. Des Portes, supra note 6. Cf.
:Barnett v. Kinney, supra note 6.
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ute,31 or because the property is real and thought to be gov-
erned by a special rule,32 or because there has not been a change
of possession,33 or because the state of the assignment does not
extend the same brand of comity as is petitioned for in the
state of the forum,34 or because the interests of local creditors
are thought to be injuriously affected.V 5 In these cases it must
be conceded that the doctrine of comity has worn exceedingly
thin and makes for uncertainty of result.0  Furthermore, the
Supreme Court will not countenance the rejection of the as-
signee's claim against subsequent non-resident attaching credi-
tors unless it clearly appears that the assignment is contrary
to the public policy of the state where suit is brought: 7 In
respect to involuntary assignments, however, the states are left
free to apply their own notions of comity and in these cases
attaching creditors are generally preferred, 5 even in respect
31 Douglas v. Bank, 97 Tenn. 133, 36 S. W. 874 (1890).
32 See note 29, supra.
33Rice v. Courtis, 32 Vt. 460 (1860); Philson v. Barnes, 50 Pa. St.
230 (1865); Smith v. Lamson, 184 Ill. 71, 56 N. E. 387 (1900).
341n re Nelson & Bro. Co., 149 Fed. 590 (S. D. N. Y. 1907). For a
criticism of such a le;x talionis see Hanford v. Paine, mtpra note 29, at 454;
Means v. Hapgood, sypra note 5, at 107.
35 Ingraham v. Geyer, 13 Blass. 146 (1816); In re Nelson Bro. & Co.,
s-upra note 34; see Sunderland, op. cit. supra note 23, at 120, for the con-
clusion that Maine, Illinois, Washington and Massachusetts are the only
states preferring domestic creditors. But see Train v. Kendall, 137 Mlass. '00
(1884). And see post. p. 601, for the possible effect of the Supreme Court
decision in the case of Blake v. McClung, infr note 48. See Sunderland,
op. cit. supra note 23, at pp. 180-182, on the practice of refusing creditors
who are residents of the state in which the assignment is made the benefit
of subsequent attachments in the state of the forum. New York has
refused to follow this distinction. Hibernia Bank v. Zacombe, 84 N. Y.
367 (1881); Warner v. Jaifray, 96 N. Y. 248 (1887).
'U Hackett, A Possible Futzure Status of Fercign Assignments to Crcdi-
tars (1900) 13 HARv. L. REv. 484.
37 Barnett v. Kinney, supra note 6.3S Upton v. Hubbard, 28 Conn. 274 (1859); Blake v. Williams, Gupra
note 30; Willitts v. Waite, 25 N. Y. 577 (1862); Barth v. Backus, 140
N. Y. 230, 35 N. E. 425 (1893); Happy v. Prickett, 24 Wash. 290, 64 Pac.
528 (1901); Segnitz -v. Garden City Trust Co., supra note 25. In the
following case the rule is apparently limited to real property. Adams v.
Hartzell, 18 N. D. 221, 119 N. W. 635 (1909). An involuntary assignment
made under the laws of one state is subject to subsequent liens valid
according to the law of the state where the property is located. Zacher
v. Fidelity Trust Co., supra note 23; Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, supra
note 3. The state of the assignment may enjoin a resident creditor from
proceeding in another state against assets there located. Cole v. Cunning-
ham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269 (1890).
An involuntary assignment made in a foreign country is ineffective
to pass title as against attaching creditors. Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch.
289 (U. S. 1809); Holmes v. Remsen, 20 Johns. 229 (N. Y. 1882); Mine
v. Moreton, 6 Binn. 353 (Pa. 1814). As regards a trustee in bankruptcy in
a foreign country, each state is free to decide how far it will permit prop-
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to debts owed to the assignor by residents of the forum.1' When
the statute of an incorporating state specifically vests a receiver
or other officer with title to all rights of action and assets of
a domestic corporation wherever situated, he acts as its statu-
tory successor, 4  and will prevail against attaching creditors.
The theory is that the corporation, being the creature of the
legislature, is compelled to act through agents whose status the
legislature can control; and that it carries with it, wherever it
goes, the laws of its domicil governing its existence and dissolu-
tion, so that those who deal with it are bound to notice of their
terms. Although greatly aided from a doctrinal standpoint by
the corporate character of the debtor, it is apparent that the
courts have been influenced by considerations of business con-
venience in reaching results in these cases.4'
From the practical standpoint, the arguments for unified ad-
ministration of the insolvent estate, whether of natural persons
or of corporations, apply alike to voluntary and involuntary
assignments. The practical benefits to be realized from the
dropping of jurisdictional barriers were set forth in the earlier
opinions holding that full effect should be given to foreign
erty to be removed as against claims of local creditors. Disconto Gesell-
schaft v. Umbreit, 208 U. S. 570, 28 Sup. Ct. 337 (1907) (equal privileges
and immunities clause of the constitution not involved when the assignment
takes place in a foreign country).
'9 Holmes v. Remsen, 20 Johns 229 (N. Y. 1822), overruling 4 Johns,
Ch. 460 (N. Y. 1820); Barth v. Backus, Upton v. Hubbard, both tupra
note 38. The mythical situas of the debt is usually not discussed in these
cases, but in Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, oupra note 38, the debt
is treated without discussion as "property within the state." In Upton
v. Hubbard, supra note 38 ,and Segnitz v. Garden City Trust Co., supra
note 25, the assignee was not allowed to sue.
In the following cases of voluntary assignment attaching creditors pre-
vailed on the ground that the debt has a situs at the home of the debtor
and is therefore property within the state. Ingraham v. Geyer, oupra
note 35; Smith v. Lamson, supra, note 33. But other courts take the
view that the debt is an incorporeal right which follows the creditor so
that, once the assignment is made, there is no debt owing to the assignor
which the latter's creditors may attach. Caskie v. Webster, 2 Wall. Jr.
131, Fed. Cas. No. 2500 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1851); Fenton v. Edwards, 126
Cal. 43, 58 Pac. 320 (1899); Birdseye v. Underhill, supra. note 5; Union
Savings Bank v. Indianapolis Lounge Co., 20 Ind. App. 325, 47 N. E.
846 (1898) (bank deposit); Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Carson, 12 Md. 54
(1857); Gregg v. Sloan, 76 Va. 497 (1882); Mowry v. Crocker, 6 Wis.
326 (1858). See BUnnxLL, op. cit. supra, note 3, § 282.
40 Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U. S. 222 (1880).; Hopkins v. Lancaster, 254
Fed. 190 (N. D. Ala. 1918); Bockover v. Life Association, 77 Va. 85
(1883). The language of comity may be used in reaching the same result.
Martyne v. American Union Insurance Co., 216 N. Y. 183, 110 N. E. 502
(1915); Gilman v. Ketcham, 84 Wis. 91, 54 N. W. 395 (1893). Contra:
Shloss v. Surety Co., 149 Iowa 382, 128 N. W. 384 (1910).
41 See particularly Martyne v. American Union Ins. Co., supra note 40,
at 975. Note (1916) 16 CoL. L. Rsv. 145.
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voluntary assignments - and likewise in the powerful though
unavailing arguments of Chancellor Kent that foreign bank-
ruptcy laws should operate with equal vigor.4 In considering
the problem in general terms, alongside the admitted benefits
of centralized administration must be set the undoubted power
of each state to control the transfer of property within its
borders.44 The most satisfactory results are those obtained when
the courts have penetrated the foggy doctrines of comity to
determine whether or not this power has been affirmatively
exercised so as to prohibit recognition of the foreign assign-
ment or stamp it definitely as against the policy of the state
of the forum.45 The interest of the state in the control of transfer
of title would seem to be sufficiently respected if it is allowed
to specify the mode of recording conveyances and liens and the
requirements of possession deemed necessary to protect subse-
quent attaching creditors without notice. 0 The line between
the legitimate protection which a state should give the rights of
local creditors and a selfish insistance upon special advantage
has not, however, been carefully traced in the assignment cases.
But it has been held,47 under the doctrine of BlvIkc. v. McClhng,43
a decision of far-reaching potentialities, that a rule by which
a state recognizes foreign assignments except as against resi-
dents or citizens 49 is contrary to the equal protections and im-
munities clause of the Constitution. If this is correct-and, so
far at least as the effect of non-recognition is to give citizens
a priority, it would seem to be correct 5°-the problem in the
- Note particularly the language of the opinion in Hanford v. Paine,
supra, note 29, and in Caskie v. Webster, supra note 39.
43 See opinion of Chancellor Kent, Holmes v. Remsen, mipra note 39, at
470.
44 Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307 (U. S. 1866), 7 Wall. 139 (U. S.
1868); Milne v. Moreton, svpro, note 38. STORY, op. Cit. supra note 28, §§
390, 410; WHARTON, CONFLICT or LAWS (3d ed. 1905) § 311a. In respect
to foreign corporations under the rule of Relfe v. Rundle, mtpra note 40,
it would seem that, as to corporations of other states, the power must
be exercised through prohibiting the acquisition of property or the doing
of business within the state, since it will not be effective as to assignments
made according to a statute of the state of incorporation vesting the
receiver for the corporation with title to its assets.
45 As in Barnett v. Kinney, supra, note 6.
4 See Stowe v. Belfast Savings Bank, supra note 29.
47 Stowe v. Belfast Savings Bank, supra note 29 (particularly the second
opinion, written after the decision in Blake v. McClung, in fra. note 48, and
confirming the lower court decision which preceded Blake v. McClung).
See WHARTON, op. cit. s-pra note 44, at 752.
48 172 U. S. 239, 19 Sup. Ct. 165 (1898).
49 Fox v. Adams, 5 Me. 245 (1828) ; Chafee v. Bank, 71 Me. 514 (1880).
so See Blake v. MeClung, supra note 48, at 253, 19 Sup. Ct. at 171. On
the authority of this case, priority to local creditors has been refused as




assignment cases as in all other forms of insolvency adminis-
tration emerges more clearly as the practical one of securing the
best treatment of the assets for the benefit of all claimants,"'
without discrimination.
The practical problem is the same when a business is in the
hands of a chancery receiver, but resort to an ancillary receiver-
ship is customary 52 whenever there are local creditors. It is
insisted upon in the federal courts, even where there is no ad-
verse demand upon the assets sought, whenever the receiver
lacks "title." 13 In states which do not follow the federal rule
suit or appearance by the primary receiver is sometimes allowed
even when there are local claimants,54 but whether he will pre-
vail will turn, first, upon whether the property has been properly
reduced to possession,55 and, second, upon considerations which
govern the transfer of assets.' 6 From a business viewpoint it
is not generally material whether the collector of the assets is
the primary receiver acting as such, or the primary receiver
who has been given an ancillary appointment, or an ancillary
receiver acting in aid of the court having primary jurisdiction
of the insolvent's affairs.
The status of the receiver in proceedings under the National
Bankruptcy Act presents a special problem. Undoubtedly the
period between the appointment of a receiver and the naming
of a trustee is one in which there is great danger of the dis-
5"A discrimination against a corporation created in another state would
not be subject to the same constitutional objection. See Blake v. McClung,
supra note 48, at 259, 19 Sup. Ct. at 173.
52 See Great Western Mining Co. v. Harris, supra note 15. Wickersham,
Primary and Ancillary Receiverships (1928) 14 VA. L. REV. 599; Byrne,
The Foreclosure of Railroad Mortgages in the United States Courts, In
STETSON, Soiu LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING (1927) 71-96) 23
R. C. L. Receivers § 157.
53 Great Western Mining Co. v. Harris, supra note 15; Sterrett v.
Second National Bank, supra note 12. In this case the court justifies the
refusal to permit suit on the ground that "there is always, theoretically at
least, a possibility that the defendant may be subjected to further suit by
the owner of the title and right of action." The attempt to distinguish
on the basis of title is criticised as shadowy by Bolles, Law Concerning
Foreign Receivers (1920) 18 YALE L. J. 488. The strictness of the federal
rule is criticised in Note (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 805.
54Buswell v. Supreme Sitting, 161 Mass. 224, 36 N. E. 1065 (1894);
Bodge v. Skinner, 115 Neb. 41, 211 N. W. 203 (1926) ; Shloss v. Surety Co.,
149 Iowa 382, 128 N. W. 384 (1910); In re First Russian Insurance Co.,
253 N. Y. 365, 171 N. E. 572 (1930).
z Standard Warehouse Co. v. Cooper, 30 F. (2d) 842 (W. D. N. C.
1929); Weber v. Waugh, 42 F. (2d) 515 (W. D. Wash. 1930); Chicago
M. & St. P. Ry. v. Keokuk Northern Packet Co., 108 Il1. 317 (1884);
Schoenwald v. McDonald, 5 Alaska 442 (1916). Davis v. Morgan Foundry,
23 S. W. (2d) 231 (Mo. 1930).
-6 Treated in Part II of this comment.
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sipation of foreign assets. That every bankruptcy court has
ancillary jurisdiction to aid the trustee or receiver appointed
in proceedings elsewhere is well established. r7 There is no prac-
tical reason why such aid should be given to the trustee directly
but be required to pass through an ancillary officer when the
proceedings are in the receivership stagez5 The difficulty again
arises from looking to the traditional restrictions upon a re-
ceiver's power. 9 For the court of primary jurisdiction, it would
seem to be sufficient, on the request of the receiver to sue in
another state, to ascertain that the suit is necessary for the
carrying out of the custodial purposes of the receivership, and
for the ancillary court to ascertain that he has been duly
authorized to bring the suit. When this practice is followed the
receiver, within his more limited powers, is enabled to perform
as vigorously and effectively as the trustee, even to the extent
of being aided by contempt orders when necessary.-Q
DISCHARGE OF DEBTOR BY ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT
OF CREDITORS
THE notoriously low percentage of creditors' total claims re-
covered as dividends upon the debtor's bankruptcy, has been
variously attributed to (1) the difficulty, of getting the most
reasonable prices for the bankrupt's assets, and the assertion of
dishonest and exorbitant claims, (2) the high cost of banlruptcy
administration, (3) the non-cooperation of creditors and (4)
57 Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U. S. 102, 30 Sup. Ct. 372 (1910). Prior to
the 1910 Amendment of the National Bankruptcy Act, supra note 19, the
decisions were in conflict as to the edstence of ancillary jurisdiction. In
re Sutter Bros., 131 Fed. 654 (S. D. N. Y. 1904) (jurisdiction recognized).
Accord: In re Benedict, supra note 19. Contra: In re Tybo Mining Co.,
132 Fed. 697 (D. Nev. 1904); In re Williams, 123 Fed. 321 (W. D. Tenn.
1903).
L8 In re Dunseath & Son Co., 168 Fed. 973 (W. D. Pa. 1909); In re
Benedict, 140 Fed. 55 (E. D. Wis. 1905). See texts cited in note 19, st.pra.
59 Note the citations in both In re Dunseath & Son Co. and In re Benedict
of Booth v. Clark, supra note 13, and Hale v. Allinson, supra note 15.
60 Receiver aided by contempt orders: In re Peiser, 115 Fed. 199 (E. D.
Pa. 1902); In re Eckhaus, 14 F. (2d) 471 (E. D. N. Y. 1926). In the
latter case two federal jurisdictions within the same state were involved.
See note (1927) 27 COL. L. Rsv. 216. Trustee aided by contempt orders:
In re Small Shoe Co., 5 F. (2d) 956 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1925) ; Scott v. Goodman,
25 F. (2d) 175, 25 F. (2d) 178 (N. D. Ohio 1928).
Statistics for voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy proceedings in the
United States show that general creditors receive as little as 6.4S% of
their unsecured liabilities. For involuntary cases alone, the return was
slightly higher, 10.11% REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (1927) 178;
see also Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for "Frkndly Adjustment"
(1928) 14 CORN. L. Q. 413, 416.
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the inadequacy of the "standard equipment" of the law courts.2
To obviate these deficiencies it has been suggested that the Na-
tional Bankruptcy Act be amended in accord with English and
continental provisions allowing "a composition of creditors to
forestall bankruptcy." 3 More recently Credit Men's Associations,
availing themselves of their extensive marketing facilities, ad-
justment experts, etc., have been able considerably to decrease
liquidation expenses and to encourage "friendly adjustment"
between debtors and creditors.4 In many instances, however, the
debtor's estate can be'disposed of most expeditiously by the de-
vice of a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors with-
out invoking the elaborate machinery provided by the Credit
Men's Associations. Under such an assignment the creditor
clearly benefits by the receipt of his share of the debtor's assets
undiminished by the expenses of a proceeding in bankruptcy. As
to the' debtor, however, there is likely to be considerable re-
luctance to give up the certainty of a complete discharg in
bankruptcy for a form of liquidation which the courts may either
declare void in its entirety or at least insofar as it attempts to
assure his release.
The questionable validity of assignments may be attributed in
part to'the uncertainty into which conflicting legislation of state
and federal governments has thrown the entire problem of the
disposition of debtors' estates. With the exercise of the Con-
gressional power to regulate bankruptcy,, 'by the passage of the
National Bankruptcy Act in 1898, the question immediately
arose whether state insolvency laws in existence prior to that
time were suspended in toto ' or only so far as they conflicted
2 Merch. Ass'n of N. Y., Report by Cor. on Bankruptcy Reform (1924)
44; Gamer, On Comparing Friendly Adjustment and Bankruptcy (1930) 16
CORN. L. Q. 35; Billig, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 417. Of. also, Sturges,
Commercial Arbitration (1924). 34 Ymx L. J. 480, 489 ot seq.
3 Dunscomb, Preventive Compositions (1914) 20 CASE AND COMMENT
594.
4 For detailed and favorable descriptions of this "extra-legal" method
of distributing debtors' estates see Billig, op. cit. supra note 1, at 425;
Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of Insolvent Es tates: A Study of
Receit Cases (1930) 78 U. op PA. L. REv. 293; of. In Defense of tho
Nation's Receivables (1927) BULLETIN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CREDIT
MEN. But for a critical review of the "benefits" of this method, see Gamer,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 37.
Congress has exercised control over bankruptcy, granted by Art. 1 §
8 of the constitution, on four distinct occasions, 1800, 1841, 1867 and 1898.
&"Both [State and federal bankruptcy legislation] cannot go on to-
gether, without) direct and positive collision; and the moment that the
bankrupt act does or may operate upon the person or the case, that
moment it virtually supersedes all state legislation." per Story, J., Ex
parte Eames, Fed. Cas. No. 4,237 (1842).
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with the Federal Act.7  Adjudications on this question, ap-
parently hopelessly discordant, are to some extent reconcilable
in 'terms of the particular situations involved. Thus it appears
that (1) where the state and federal laws both expressly provide
for the situation, the former must yield; 8 (2) where the person
or act has not'been brought within the scope of the federal law,
the state law controls9 But where a particular situation is con-
templated by some provisions of the Federal Act and expressly
excluded from the operation of others, and the state law seeks
to comprehend only to the extent that the Federal Act excludes,
the conflict appears irreconcilable. It is contended, on the one
hand, that state legislation 'is not complementary to federal
legislation and that where Congress has manifested an intent to
deal with a subject that field is closed to state action.W ' In 'op-
position it is argued that it is not the mere existence but the
exercise of the federal power to establish a genuine bankruptcy
law in conflict with the state laws which renders the latter
inoperative.-
With the statutory 'regulation of the common-law right to
assign developing alongside of, and in many instances crossing
over and merging with, state insolvency laws, it became in-
creasingly difficult for the courts'to identify either and determine
7 5 REIqINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (3d ed. 1923) § 2107; Ogden v. Saunders,
12 'Wheat. 213 (U. S. 1827) ; Tua v. Carriere, 117 U. S. 201, 6 Sup. Ct. 565
(1886); Carling v. Seymour Lumber Co., 113 Fed. 483 (C. C. A. 5th, 1902);
In re International Coal Mining Co., 143 Fed. 665 (D. C. Pa. 1906), aff'd,
Cresson & Clearfield Coal & Coke Co. v. Stauffer, 148 Fed. 981 (C. C. A.
3d, 1906).
8 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (U. S. 1819); Harborough v.
Costello, 184 Ill. 110, 56 N. E. 363 (1900); see also BLACK, B.KIuPTCy
(1924) 9 et deq.
9 Johnson v. Crawford, 154 Fed. 761 (C. C. Pa. 1907); Shepardson's
Appeal, 36 Conn. 23 (1869); Geery's Appeal, 43 Conn. 289 (1876); Herron
Co. v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. 279, 68 Pac. 814 (1902) ; In re Winternitz,
7 Phila. 380 (Pa. 1870); Landis Machine Co. v. Cooper, 53 Pa. Super. Ct.
416 (1913).
2 'Re Bruso-Ritter Co., 90 Fed. 651 (E. D. Wis. 1898) ; Littlefield v. Gay,
96 Me. 422, 52 AtI. 925 (1902); Moody v. Development Co., 102 Me. 365,
66 AtI. 967 (1907); Parmenter Mfg. Co. v. Hamilton, 172 Mass. 178, 51
N. E. 529 (1898); see also Williston, Effect of 'lational Bankirptcy Laze on
State Laws (1909) 22 HARv. L. REV. 547; Note (1931) 35 DICKInSON L.
REv. 78.
"I Old Town Bank v. McCormick, 96 Md. 341, 53 Atl. 934 (1903); Singer
v. Nat. Bedstead Mfg. Co., 65 N. J. Eq. 290, 55 Atl 868 (1903). So, prior
to the amendment of 1910, state courts could assume jurisdiction over
voluntary bankruptcies of corporations, Roberts Cotton Oil Co. v. lorse
& Co., 97 Ark. 513, 135 S. W. 334 (1911); also involuntary proceedings
against -wage earners or persons engaged chiefly in farming. Pitcher v.
Standish, 90 Conn. 601, 98 Atl. 93 (1916). But state statutes are sus-
pended as to voluntary bankruptcy of farmers. Rockville National Bank v.
Latham, 88 Conn. 70, 89 Atl. 1117 (1914).
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the extent of conflict with the Bankruptcy Act. For, where the
common-law right to assign is subject only to a superficial regu-
lation by state °statutes,' 2 as, for example, filing requirements,
the assignment is voidable only by bankruptcy' proceedings
brought within four months.13  And though the assignment is
an act of bankruptcy," any creditor acquiescing either by re-
ceiving'his share or standing by and allowing the assignment to
be consummated is estopped from petitioning the debtor into
bankruptcy.'s But an assignment under a state law which em-
powers the state courts to assume jurisdiction'over the disposi-
tion of debtors' estates, to require the assignee to act under their
supervision, to compel creditors to come in and prove their
claims and to discharge the debtor automatically is usually held
to be void even after the four months' period on the ground that
such a statute is in the nature of an insolvency law and is there-
fore suspended by'the Federal Act.' Since such an assignment
is open to collateral attack, a creditor taking under such proceed-
ings is not estopped from petitioning the debtor into bank-
ruptcy.17 Even in 'these states, however, a common law assign-
ment may be valid as a conveyance unaffected by the National
12 Such statutes are not suspended by the National Bankruptcy Act.
Mayer v. Hellman, 91 U. S. 496 (1876) ; In re Sievers, 91 Fed. 366 (E. D.
Mo. 1899), aff'd, Davis v. Bohle, 92 Fed. 325 (1899); Binder v. McDonald,
106 Wis. 332, 82 N. W. 156 (1900).
13Boese v. King, 108 U. S. 379, 2 Sup. Ct. 765 (1883). If bankruptcy
proceedings are brought more than four months after the assignment, it
cannot be set aside by the trustee nor is he entitled to the possession and
administration of the estate as against the assignee. Mayer v. Hellman,
supra note 12 (6 months' period because under Act of 1867) ; In re Arledge,
Fed. Cas. No. 533 (S. D. Ga. 1873) ; In re Farrell, 176 Fed. 505 (C. C. A.
6th, 1910). But otherwise, where proceedings in bankruptcy are brought
within the four months' period. May v. Henderson, 268 U. S. 111, 45 Sup.
Ct. 456 (1925) ; Stellwegen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605, 38 Sup. Ct. 215 (1918);
In re Louis Newburger, 240 Fed. 947 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
14 30 STAT. 546 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 21 (1926).
isIn re Romanow, 92 Fed. 510 (D. Mass. 1899); Simmonson v.
Sinsheimer, 95 Fed. 948 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899); In re Creech Bros. Lumber
Co., 240 Fed. 8 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917). See also 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTOY (13th
ed. 1923-4) 1221 and authorities cited, n. 89.
6In re Smith, 92 Fed. 135 (D. Ind. 1899) ; Thornhill v. Bank of Louisi-
ana, Fed. Cas. No. 13, 992 (C. C. D. La. 187.0); Rowe v. Page, 54 N. H. 190
(1874); Pelton v. Sheridan, 74 Ore. 176, 144 Pac. 410 (1914); First
National Bank of Bandon v. Mannassa, 80 Ore. 53, 150 Pac. 258 (1915).
But of. Shaw v. Standard Piano Co., 87 N. J. Eq. 350, 100 Atl. 167 (1917)
and Carling v. Seymour Lumber Co., supra note 7, where actions taken
under state insolvency laws were held voidable at most and that only at tho
instance of the trustee in bankruptcy. See, too, S5iTIu, EQUITABL
REMEDIES OF CREDITORS (1899) § 402; 5 REMINGTON, op. Cit. supra note 7,
at § 2076.
"In re Weedman Stave Co., 199 Fed. 948 (E. D. Ark. 1912); see 2
COLLIER, Joe. cit. supra note 15.
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Bankruptcy Act."' Furthermore, some statutes go beyond a mere
superficial regulation and supplement the common law right to
assign with the essential feature of insolvency laws, that is, the
complete discharge of the debtor after the distribution of his
estate. Yet, 'rather than hold such an assignment.to be suspended
as a state insolvency law, the courts have spuriously argued that
since state laws are suspended only to the extent that they con-
flict with the Federal Act, and since the discharge of the debtor
is entirely separate from the right to assign inherent in the
ownership of property and existing at common law independent
of statute, the discharge provision alone is suspended. 0
While statutory prescriptions for discharge in the case of all
common law assignments are thus suspended by the Bankruptcy
Act, the legality of a specific stipulation for release included in
the deed of assignment must still be judged by its status at com-
mon law.20  In England an assignment which conveys all the
debtor's property and provides for his release is held to be valid.21
The predominant rule in this country, on the other hand, is said
to deny the validity of an assignment with a stipulation for re-
lease But this is true only where the release is coupled with
provisions cutting off all non-assenting creditors from partici-
pating in the assignment and reserving their shares to the as-
signor himself.? The prevailing current of state decisions up-
holds the validity of an assignment where the condition of re-
lease creates a preference only, and allows non-assenting credi-
tors to share in the surplus.24 While the federal courts, on the
few occasions when the question has come before them, have
upheld the validity of such assignments, they have done so re-
luctantly and have been influenced in their decision by the con-
Is Danville Auburn Auto Co. v. Nat'l Trust & Credit Co., 212 Ill. App.
116 (1918); Pogue v. Rowe, 236 Ill. 157, 86 N. E. 207 (1908); Patty-
Joiner & Eubanks v. Cummins, 93 Tex. 598, 57 S. W. 56G (1900) ; see also
Williston, op. cit. supra note 10, at 559.
9 In re Tarnowski, 191 Wis. 279, 210 N. W. 836 (1926) ; Boese v. King,
supra note 13; Stellwegen v. Clum, supr. note 13; Binder v. McDonald,
supra note 12.
20 In re Bridge, 230 Fed. 184 (W. D. Wash. 1916) ; Sabin v. Chrisman,
79 Ore. 191, 154 Pac. 908 (1916); Patty-Joiner & Eubank v. Cummins,
mpra note 18; Hajek & Simicek v. Luck, 96 Tex. 517, 74 S. W. 305 (1903).
23 King v. Watson, 3 Price (Exch.) 6 (1816); see Janes v. Whitebread,
20 L. J. C. P. (N. S.) 217, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 431 (1851); Forbes v.
Lumond, 4 De G., M. & G. 297 (1854). See also BUnmRL, AsSIGNMENTS
(6th ed. 1894) § 149.
22 BURRmL, op. cit. supra note 21, § 164.
2 3 iller v. Conklin, 17 Ga. 430 (1854); Conkling v. Carson, 11 flL 503
(1850); Bridges v. Hindes, 16 Md. 101 (1860).
24 2 KENT, COMMENTARiES §§ 534, 536; Andrews v. Ludlow, 5 Pick. 28
(Mass. 1827); see also Halsey v. Fairbanks, Fed. Cas. No. 5,9G4 (C. C. D.
Mass. 1826) (held good, even though a partial assignment).
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struction of such deeds by the courts in the states where they
were.executed. 25
Previous to the passage of the Bankruptcy Act an assignment
with a stipulation for release may have been repugnant to the
court's sense of justice in that the debtor was not only coercing
the creditors into relinquishing part of their'demand 20 but was
also preventing them from bringing attachment proceedings by
putting his property beyond their reach until they complied with
the provisions of the instrument. A non-assenting creditor was
therefore without legal remedy until after the distribution of
the assets under the assignment and stood to lose all if the sur-
plus proved negligible. For these reasons a composition agree-
ment seemed preferable, for, although it exacted a complete
release after the payment of a portion of the creditor's claim,
it nevertheless allowed a non-assenting creditor immediately to
attach the assets.27 But, today, the creditor's ability to attach
the insolvent debtor's estate for the payment of his debt is prac-
tically worthless since either the debtor or the proper number
of other creditors may file a petition in bankruptcy and dissipate
the attaching creditor's preference.2 8  Where the debtor sur-
renders his right to receive a complete discharge in bankruptcy
and instead makes an assignment at the request of his creditors
whereby their share of the assets are saved from depletion by
the exorbitant costs of bankruptcy, there seems to be no basis
for the emotional reaction against the validity of a release stipu-
lation. Moreover, although an assignment is an act of bank-
ruptcy, it is not repugnant to the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act
to distribute the assets of the debtor ratably among his creditors
and to relieve him from the burden of debts which through busi-
ness misfortunes or otherwise he is unable to pay.21
25 Brashear v. West, 7 Pet. 608 (U. S. 1833); Halsey v. Fairbanks, mzpra
note 24; see BuRmLL, op. c t. supra, note 21, § 163; 2 KENT, COMMENTA?.S
§ 534 n. (c).
26 See Widgery v. Haskell, 5 Mass. 144, 152 (1809) ; Grover v. Wakeman,
11 Wend. 187, 201 (N. Y. 1833); also BUDIP, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
(3d ed. 1882) 428.
2 7T HUNT, ACCORD & SATISFACTION, COMPROMISE AND COMPOSITION AT
COMMON LAW (1912) 384, 414, 437.28 Remington, Bankruptcy Law and the Peaceable Settlement of Business
Failures (1909) 18 YALE L. J. 590.
29 See Taft, J., in Leidigh Carriage Co. v. Stengel, 95 Fed. 637, 647
(C.C.A. 6th, 1899). So the assignor is not stigmatized as having intended to
hinder, delay and defraud creditors by the transfer and is not thus barred
from receiving a discharge in bankruptcy proceedings brought later on.
1 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 15, at 565.
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STATE TAXES ALNrD THE NATIONAL BANKS
AMONG the most serious and constant dangers which confront
state taxes is that of being declared invalid by the courts as
discriminating against the federal instrumentality of national
banks. Congress, in its discretion to determine how the banks
may be taxed,' has granted the states authority to levy upon
national bank shares held by the stockholders but only on con-
dition that competing "moneyed capital" be taxed at the same
rate2 The problems thus raised, as to what capital competes
and what rates are the same have provoked endless litigation
for well over sixty years.3
In affirming Puwblic National Bank v. Keating - the Federal
Supreme Court recently imposed upon New York State and the
City of New York the necessity of refunding to the banks over
$30,000,000 collected during the years 1923 to 1926.5 The state
statute involved, which established an ad valorem share tax, was
phrased in the precise words of the Act of Congress., Never-
'The extent of Congressional authority in this matter is in some dis-
pute and has not been directly passed upon. That it is practically un-
limited, see the first of the comprehensive articles by Traynor, Natimal
Bank Taxation, in California (1929) 17 CALi. L. REv. 83, 232, 456. That
Congress would probably. have no power to permit serious discrimination
against the banks see Rottschaefer, State Ta.xat ion of National Banlx
(1923) 7 MI[INN. L. REV. 357, 377. See also Schweppe, State Taxation of
National Banks Stocks: Uncertainty of its Constitutional Basis (1922)
6 M NN. L. Rnv. 219.
2 44 STAT. 223 (1926), 12 U. S. C. § 548 (1926), prescribing four methods,
of which the share-tax is one. The relevant portion declares, "In the case
of a tax on said shares the tax imposed shall not be at a greater rate than
is assessed on other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens
of such state coming into competition with the business of national banks:
Provided, that bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness in the hands
of individual citizens not employed or engaged in the banking business
and representing merely personal investments not made in competition
-with such business, shall not be deemed moneyed capital within the mean-
ing of this section." The permission was first granted by 13 STAT. 112
(1864). The law has been amended three times, 15 STAT. 34 (1868), 42
STAT. 1499 (1923), 44 STAT. 223 (1926). It was § 5219 in the Revised
Statutes of 1874, by which number it is often referred to at present.
a For various of the historic, aspects of the problem and their bearing
on the present situation see, in addition to the authorities cited in note 1,
supra, Bolles, Same Aspects of National Bank Taxation (1909) 57 U. oF
PA. L. Rnv. 505; Bryan, State Taxation of National Banks (1914) 24 YALE
L. J. 149; Buschmann, Taxatiom of National Bank Shares (1931) 6 ID.
L. J. 316.
447 F. (2d) 561 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), affg 38 F. (2d) 279 (S. D. N. Y.
1930), noted in (1930). 30 COL. L. REV. 578.
5 Keating v. Public National Bank (mere.), 52 Sup. Ct. 137 (1931).
See New York Times, Dec. 8, 1931. p. 1, col. 3.
6 TAx LAW, CA~IML'S CONSOL. LAws (1923) c. 61, § 4-a; see also §§ 13,
14, 24, 25.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
theless it was held invalid by the two lower federal courts and
an injunction was granted against collection of the levy for
1926. The ground for these decisions was that the New York
Court of Appeals, in construing the statute in the case of People
ex rel. Pratt v. Goldfogle 7 and a group of connected cases," had
read into it a definition of competing capital which was more
restricted than that incorporated into the Federal Act by the
decisions of the Supreme Court, so that many of the bank's
competitors escaped taxation. The Supreme Court has said in
Minnesota v. First National Bank of St. Paul 0 that "the com-
petition guarded against ... may arise from the employment of
capital invested by institutions or individuals in particular opera-
tions or investments like those of national banks." 10 Para-
phrasing this statement the circuit court contrasted it with the
following excerpt from the Pratt opinion: "We at once con-
clude that the competition here prescribed means a condition of
business rivalry which arises when moneyed capital is devoted
with reasonable continuity and regularity to employment and
operations which have for their primary and characteristic pur-
pose, as distinguished from some incidental operations or de-
tails, the transaction of some branch of business which may be
carried on by national banks." ". The circuit court apparently
interpreted this passage in the Pratt opinion to mean that no
capital is competitive except that used in businesses similar to
the banking business.- But only a few lines below the excerpt
7242 N. Y. 277, 151 N. E. 452 (1926), aff'g 213 App. Div. '706, 211
N. Y. Supp. 110 (1st Dep't 1925), aff'g 123 Misc. Rep, 399, 205 N. Y. Supp.
870 (Sup. Ct. 1924); see (1927) 27 COL. L. Rav. 93.
8 People ex rel. Bonner v. Goldfogle, 242 N. Y. 541, 152 N. E. 418 (1926),
aff'g 213 App. Div. 715, 211 N. Y. Supp. 119; People ex rel. Berdan v.
Goldfogle, 242 N. Y. 542, 152 N. E. 419, aff'g 213 App. Div. '702,
211 N. Y. Supp. 107; People ex rel. Peabody, Houghteling & Company,
Inc. v. Goldfogle, 242 N. Y. 543, 152 N. E. 419, af'g 213 App. Dlv.
710, 211 N. Y. Supp. 114; People ex rel. James Talcott, Inc, v.
Goldfogle, 242 N. Y. 544, 152 N. E. 420, aff'g 213 App. Div. 719, 211
N. Y. Supp. 122; People ex rel. Bankers Commercial Security Company,
Inc., 242 N. Y. 545, 152 N. E. 420, aff'g 213 App. Div. 716, 211 N. Y.
Supp. 120; People ex rel. Bankard v. Goldfogle, 242 N. Y. 546, 152 N.
E. 420, aff'g 213 App. Div. 713, 211 N. Y. Supp. 117. All these c0ase
were decided in 1925 in the first department, affirming separately causes
consolidated in 123 Misc. Rep. 399, 205 N. Y. Supp. 870 (Sup, Ct. 1924).
9 273 U. S. 561, 47 Sup. Ct. 468 (1927), decided the same day as First
National Bank of Hartford v. Hartford, Wisconsin, 273 U. S. 548, 47
Sup. Ct. 462, and Georgetown National Bank v. McFarland, 273 U. S.
568, 47 Sup. Ct. 467. In the three cases Mr. Justice Stone spoke for a
unanimous court. All are noted in (1927) 11 MIANN. L. REV. 677.
10 Supra note 9, at 567, 47 Sup. Ct. at 470. In this and the subsequent
quotations, the italics are the writers.
IlSupr& note 7, at 302, 151 N. E. at 461.
22 The Circuit Court stated that the Supreme Court "did not Imply
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chosen by the Circuit Court, the state court had clarified its own
words by referring to "our interpretation of competition as
meaning an employment of moneyed capital whose characteristic
and principal purpose brings it into rivalry with the business
of banks 3. ." No doubt was expressed but that the capital
of individuals 9mwy compete, in some circumstances, merely by
virtue of its investment in securities similar to those sought by
banks. 4 The discussion pertained to businesses only and the
theory advanced was simply that there are some businesses
whose purposes-whose economic functions--are so different
from those of national banks that, even though they may invest
in some or many of the same securities as dQ banks, their capital,
and hence the shares of that capital in the hands of individuals,
cannot be considered competitive. Such a theory merely incor-
porates decisions of the Supreme Court holding that deposits
in savings banks,' 5 shares in insurance companies,", and per-
that equality of taxation under the federal statute refers only to moneyed
capital invested in business substantially identical with the business car-
ried on by national banks." Public National Bank v. Keating, supra note
4, at 564.
S13uS2pra note 7, at 303, 151 N. E. at 461.
34 The following dictum has not been overlooked: ". . the individual
-who, from time to time for the sake of investing his money, takes a
mortgage, buys a bond or 100 shares of stock, clearly would not be en-
gaged in competitive business." Pratt v. Goldfogle, supram note 7, at 3U03,
151 N. E. at 462. The court was here elaborating its interpretation of
the federal statute "as meaning a competition which is something more
than isolated or sporadic transactions . . ." Ibid. at 303, 151 N. E. at
461. The dictm must be read in the light of the following considerations,
among others: (a) the total of competitive capital must be szbstential
in aount First National Bank v. Hartford, supra note 9, at 558, 47
Sup. Ct. at 465. (b) Capital, to come within the federal statute must
be .. . employed in suelh a way as to bring it into substantial competition
." First National Bank of Guthrie Center v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 341,
348, 46 Sup. Ct. 135, 138 (1926). (c) "It is not sufficient to show that
untaxed capital is invested in loans and securities without showing also
that the class of investments favored is open to national banks." First
National Bank v. Hartford, supra note 9, at 558, 47 Sup. Ct. at 466.
(d) The cpurt had not overlooked the Anderson case, supra, which held
that merely personal investments might be competitive in spite of the
1923 amendment which inserted the proviso in the federal statute, supra
note 2. See People ex rel. Pratt v. Goldfogle, supra note 7, at 298, 151
N. E. at 459; (1927) 41 HARv. L. R.v. 82, 84; (1926) 10 MINN. L. Rlv.
241, 271.
15 Davenport Bank v. Davenport Board of Equalization, 123 U. S. 83,
8 Sup. Ct. 73 (1887); National Bank of Redemption v. Boston, 125 U. S.
60, 8 Sup. Ct. 772 (1888). "No one can suppose for a moment that savings
banks come into any possible competition with national banks of the United
States." Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138, 161, 7 Sup. Ct.
826, 838 (1887).
1,5People v. Commissioners, 4 Wall. 244 (U. S. 1866); National Bank
of Redemption v. Boston, supra note 15. "A railroad company, a mining
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haps in building and loan associations' 7 are non-competitive
capital, not to mention the stock of ordinary commercial and
industrial enterprises.18 These decisions obviously limit all dicta
which declare mere investment in similar securities an infallible
criterion of competition. Consequently, in commenting that
".... whatever supposed competition there was in the way of
loaning money was indirect and was simply incidental to the
main business which was not a competitive one . . ." II the New
York court did not say that indirect, remote, or incidental com-
petition would be overlooked. On the contrary it suggested that
if a normally non-competing business were to invest a substantial
portion of its capital in securities similar to any of those sought
by banks the character and extent of those investments would
be evidence of a business purpose similar to that of banks, so,
that the business as a whole might cease to be non-competitive
and its shares be taxable. Such a suggestion imports an atti-
tude perhaps more generous to the banks than that of the
Supreme Court itself.
While there is thus nothing in the doctrine of the Pratt case
which required it to be held erroneous, nor in its naked holding,
since the relator Pratt was held taxable, several connected cases
elsewhere treated in per curiam opinions and incorporated into
the Pratt opinion by reference, were also relied on by the federal
courts in reaching their conclusions. 2' In these cases the relators
were exempted from equal taxation with the banks. The Talcott
case 2 involved a corporation doing business as a textile factor,
storing and selling goods, and guaranteeing and collecting pay-
ment on a commission basis. The business in general seems
company, an insurance company, or any other corporation of that descrip-
tion, may have a large part of its capital invested in securities payable
in money . . . but .. .the shares of stock in such companies held by in-
dividuals are not moneyed capital." Mercantile Bank v. New York, supra
note 15, at 156, 7 Sup. Ct. at 836.
17Lander v. Mercantile Bank, 186 U. S. 458, 22 Sup. Ct. 908 (1902),
af'g Mercantile Bank v. Hubbard, 98 Fed. 465 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 189);
First National Bank of Glendive v. Dawson County, 66 Mont. 321, 213
Pac. 1097 (1923). But cf. Commercial Nat. Bank of Columbus, Ohio v.
Treasurer of Franklin County, 45 F. (2d) 213 (S. D. Ohio 1930); Peoplo
ex rel. Morfis Plan Co. of Buffalo v. Burke, 253 N. Y. 85, 170 N. E. 502
(1930) (Morris Plan loans).
:1 Talbott v. Silver Bow County, 139 U. S. 438, 11 Sup. Ct. 594 (1891);
Aberdeen Bank v. Chehaliq County, 166 U. S. 440, 17 Sup. Ct. 629 (1897),;
see the quotation from Mercantile Bank v. New York, supra note 15, and
the following from the same case: "Neither is the difference to be deter-
mined by the character of the investments in which, either by law or in
fact, the bulk of the capital and the accumulated surplus of the corpora-
tion is from time to time invested." 121 U. S. at 153, 7 Sup. Ct. at 834.
29 Supra note 7, at 303, 151 N. E. at 461.
2oSupra note 8.
21 People ex rel. Talcott, Inc. v. Goldfogle, supra note 8.
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clearly non-competitive. As to the fact that the company charged
its principals interest where it paid them before collecting from
the purchaser, the Appellate Division properly held that such
payments were advances and not loans, and hence not made in
competition with the loan phase of banking.=2 The Cornmcrciad
Secwrity case 23 was brought by a corporation dealing entirely
in installment paper evidencing sales of pianos on deferred pay-
ments. The controversy concerned the nature of the entire busi-
ness. In finding it non-competitive the Appellate Division rested
on the facts of the particular case alone, concluding that New
York banks did not in fact participate in the transactions in-
volved. The opinion adheres so closely to the special case that
it cannot have controlled administrative discretion except in
businesses similar in every detail. The decision in the Pcabady
ease,24 which involved a corporation engaged solely in buying
and selling corporate bonds, is grounded on the lack of express
or incidental authority in national banks to deal in tiis manner
in the restricted type of security there handled.2 The remaining
cases dealt with firms doing business as stockbrokers. If it be
conceded that the main business of stockbrokers is non-competi-
-tive, either because its purpose is different or because banks
lack the power to deal in the particular securities or at least to
speculate in them,2 the question remains whether loans made
22 The relevant characteristics of advances are discussed in Appeal of
Talcott, 3 App. Div. 578, 38 N. Y. Supp. 338 (1st. Dep't 1896); Talcott
v. Waller, 191 Fed. '725 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911); Newburger-Morris Company
v. James Talcott, 219 N. Y. 505, 114 N. E. 846 (1916).
23 People ex rel. Bankers Commercial Security Company, Inc., supra note
8. 24 People ex rel. Peabody Houghteling & Company, Inc. v. Goldfogle,
supra note 8.
25 There was no issue as to federal, state, municipal, railroad, or utility
bonds, or bonds secured by such mortgages as national banks' are em-
powered to acquire. It has been held that a national bank may not engage
in selling corporate bonds on commission. Weckler v. First National Bank
of Hagerstown, 42 Md. 581 (1875); ef. Farmers' & Merchants & National
Bank v. Smith, 77 Fed. 129 (C. C. A. 8th, 1896); Curtis v. Metcalf, 259
Fed. 961 (D. R. I. 1919). That it has no power whatever to deal in bonds,
see Leonhardt v. Small, 117 Tenn. 153, 164, 96 S. W. 1051, 1053 (1906).
It may, of course, take them as collateral on loans. Curtis v. Metcalf,
supra. National banks may not participate in speculative enterprises or
purchase securities for speculative purposes. First National Bank of
Ottowa v. Converse, 200 U. S. 425, 26 Sup. Ct. 306 (1906); Merchants'
National Bank of Cincinnati v. Wehrman, 202 U. S. 295, 26 Sup. Ct. 613
(1906); see First National Bank of Charlotte v. National Exchange Bank
of Baltimore, 39 Md. 600, 610 (1873), aff'd 92 U. S. 122 (1876) ; McBoyle
v. Union National Bank, 162 Cal. 277, 281, 122 Pac. 458, 461 (1912);
Chapman v. First National Bank of Mineola, 285 S. W. 1118, 1119 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1926); cf. Cassatt v. First National Bank of West New York,
9 N. J. Alisc. Rep. 848, 156 Ati. 278 (1931).
2G It has been held that the brokerage business is distinct from the
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by brokers to customers compete. To the degree that such loans
are financed by re-hypothecation of customers' securities the
capital used is obviously not that of the broker.2 On the other
hand, the net capital of the broker is frequently used only to
increase the amount of the loan beyond that which banks are
willing to lend on the security. In such cases it is not unreason-
able to consider it as employed in a different type of investment
than that made by banks, or one not substantially competitive;
or to argue, in the phraseology of the New York court, that the
employment of capital in such a manner may be merely inci-
dental to a non-competitive business. Thus it should have been
quite possible in the Keating case for the federal courts to dis-
cover harmony between the New York and federal decisions.
While the validity of the statute would be irrelevant if dis-
crimination in fact could still be shown,28 it might have been
possible, granted a valid law, to deny equitable relief on grounds
of adequate remedies once available by administrative review,
or legal action in the state courts to recover taxes paid.21,
As part of the torrent of litigation which has submerged the
share tax in the last decade the Keating case should help to con-
vince state governments that the tax is unworkable. Perhaps for
this reason the decision may be justified, since the alternative
of the income tax is now open. 0 But the very fact that the share
tax iso being abandoned by the states23 strips long-range con-
banking business. Farmers' & Merchants & National Bank v. Smith,
supra note 25; of. California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362, 17 Sup.
Ct. 831 (1897); McBoyle v. Union National Bank, supra note 25, As to
a national bank's power to deal in bonds, or to speculate see note 25, supra.
It has been held that a national bank has no power to purchase, sub-
scribe for, or invest in stocks of other corporations and that a contract
by which it assumes to do so is void. California Bank v. Kennedy, supra;
of. Firsti National Bank v. Hawkins, 174 U. S. 364, 19 Sup. Ct. 739 (1899) ;
Hotchkin v. Syracuse Third National Bank, 219 Mass. 234, 106 N. E. 974
(1914).
27 Compari the argument in First National Bank of Guthrie Center
v. Anderson, 196 Iowa 587, 604, 192 N. W. 6, 14 (1923), rcv'd 269 U. S.
341, 46 Sup. Ct. 135 (1926), wherein the existence of the practices urged
as a defense by the state was held to be unproved. The New York banks
would seem, to have profited rather than suffered by the activities of
brokers in the gala years.
28 The bank has the burden of proving that untaxed capital is com-
petitive. Georgetown National Bank v. McFarland, supra note 9.
29 See Montana National Bank of Billings v. Yellowstone County, 276
U. S. 499, 505, 48 Sup. Ct. 331, 333 (1928).
30 By the admendments of 1923 and 1926, see note 2, supra. The method
presents problems of its own, however, in connection with tax-exempt securi-
ties. Cf. Macallen Company v. Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620, 49 Sup. Ct,
432 (1929); see Traynor, op. cit. supra note 1, at 456 et seq.




siderations of some of their importance, inasmuch as prediction,
always very difficult, here becomes in some degree unnecessary.
Before the principal case came into court New York had changed
its law,3 2 and the taxes for the year 1926 were to have been the
last of their kind. Freed in this way, a sense of justice more
closely focussed upon the times and the parties and considerate
of the risks run by inflicting huge financial burdens on local
government during the crisis, might have wrought differently.
Issues of quite another kind are presented in the case of Iowa-
Des Moines Notionw. Bank v. Bennett,:3 reversing a decision of
the Supreme Court of Iowa. 4 There the statute and its inter-
pretation are concededly valid but intentional and repeated dis-
crimination in administration clearly appears. The state code
provided for the taxation of national and state bank shares and
competitive capital at one rate and for the taxation of non-
competing investments at a rate which was only from one-fifth
to one-seventh as great.35 The assessor and the board of review
correctly applied the bank rate in taxing the shares of a number
of competing domestic corporations. But after the board had
adjourned for the year, so that administrative review was im-
possible, the county auditor changed these assessments. Although
conceding the discrimination thus practised, the state court held
that the auditor was without authority to make the alteration
and that consequently his act and the ensuing collection were
void and not attributable to the state. The balance of the taxes
due from the bank's competitors were still collectible, the court
said, and the banks would have to await action to that end by
the proper officials or initiate proceedings themselves to compel
such action. In reversing, the Supreme Court held that the state
was responsible for the consequences of the illegal acts of its
twxing officers and that in addition, the state court, in giving
judgment against the bank, had ratified the act of the state in
retaining the taxes known to be wrongfully collected. The most
interesting element of the case, however, is the Supreme Court's
further statement that "a taxpayer who has been subjected to
discriminatory taxation through the favoring of others in viola-
tion of Federal law, cannot be required himself to assume the
burden of seeking an increase of the taxes which the others
should have paid." 36
Of the two cases cited by the Supreme Court for this proposi-
22 TAx LAw, CAHmL'S CONSOL. LAWS (1930) c. 61, § 219 rr et scq.
-3 52 Sup. Ct. 133 (1931), with which, on questions of equal protection,
was tried Central State Bank v. Bennett, ibid. Opinion by Brandeis, J.,
no dissent.
34 Iowa National Bank v. Stewart, 232 N. W. 445 (Iowa 1930); noted
in (1931) 19 GEo. L. J. 382.
3z IOWA CODF SUP. (1913) §§ 1310, 1311, 1321, 1322, 1322-1a.
26 Supra note 33, at 2340:3.
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tion, 7 that of Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. R.38 involved
a corporation taxed on its intangibles at 75 per cent of their
value while the property of individuals in the state was taxed
at only 60 per cent in violation of the equality provisions of
the Kentucky constitution. A Kentucky statute provided that
the county boards of supervisors should examine the assessment
books annually and alter all entries which unmistakable evi-dence might show did not represent fair cash value, the boardsbeing given the power to hear complaints and summon witnesses.
The Supreme Court rejected the suggestion that this machinery
might be used by the injured tax payer to increase the assess-
ments of others. The grounds given were that (a) it was not
shown that the complaining company had any distinctive inter-
est beyond that of ordinary citizens of the state to enable it to
compel such increases in such a way, (b) there was no precedentfor such a thing, and (c) the remedy of reassessment appearedto be a public, not a private one. In the second case cited, SiouxCity Bridge Company v. Dakota County, Nebraka,-o the BridgeCompany's real property was assessed at 100 per cent of itsvaluation in accordance with state law while all other realty inthe county was assessed at 50 per cent. The Nebraska court held
that the company was not entitled to a reduction, the proper
remedy being to have the taxes on the other property increased.No means were suggested for the accomplishment of such a
result. Following the Greene case the Supreme Court reversedthe decision with the explanation that it denied an injured tax-payer all remedy since "it is utterly impossible for him by anyjudicial proceeding to secure an increase in the assessment of
the great mass of under-assessed property in the taxing dis-
trict." 40
It is clear that both of these authorities draw their strengthfrom the fact that no procedure was shown to be available as
a substitute for the reductions allowed. And in the principal
case the court makes it plain that there is nothing inherentlypreferable in a decrease of a complaining taxpayer's assessment
as opposed to an increase of other assessments.41 The objection
'1 Two other cases, cited at this point, Chicago Great Western RailwayCompany v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 45 Sup. Ct. 55 (1924) and CumberlandCoal Company v. Board of Revision, 52 Sup. Ct. 48 (1931), were apparently
not used to support this statement but to support connected sentences.
38244 U. S. 499, 37 oSup. Ct. 673 (1916).
39 260 U. S. 441, 43 Sup. Ct. 190 (1923).40 Ibid. 446, 43 Sup. Ct. at 192.
41 "It may be assumed that all ground for a claim for refund wouldhave fallen if the state, promptly upon discovery of the discrimination,had removed it by collecting the additional taxes from the favored com-petitors. By such collection the petitioners' grievances would have boon
redressed, for these are not primarily overassessment. The right invoked
616 [Vol. 41
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is rather to the imposition of what seems to have been considered
an undue burden of self-defense. Yet it may be assumed with-
out extravagance that where a taxpayer has timely knowledge
of unauthorized leniency to others, or where constructive knowl-
edge may fairly be established, he might -ithout harshness be
required to make protest to the offending officer. And if to the
officer why not to the officer's superiors who might compel a
correction? If to them why not to a court, if adequate correc-
tive machinery be available? Plainly, the party discriminated
against must bring his action in any case. And it should make
no difference that the time available for the enforcement of an
increase must of necessity be limited to that within which the
state may exercise its power of reassessment.42 It is unlikely
that any greater burden of vigilance would normally be imposed
than that met by taxpayers compelled to take their usual first
resort to administrative boards within a given period.
In the principal case the Iowa court suggested that the remedy
of mandamus might be available to the plaintiffs to compel the
raising of their competitors' taxes. At that date, over ten years
after the cause of action arose, it was obviously impossible to
correct the error in that manner. The findings indicate, however,
that the banks, at or shortly after the time of the under-assess-
ments, were aware of the discriminations, yet made no protest,
at least none to the auditor's superiors. Under these circum-
stances if it had been shown that mandamus was available to
the banks at the time of the levy, a court of equity might have
been justified in refusing relief on grounds of estoppel, laches,
fraud on other taxpayers, or the requirement of clean hands,
where, to the damage of the state, the remedy was not used.3
It is not unusual law, and it was established in Iowa when
the principal case arose, that an auditor who, as here, is exer-
cising merely ministerial and non-discretionary powers of
transcription, may be compelled by mandamus to correct un-
authorized' changes in the tax rolls even after the rolls have
passed out of his hands into the hands of the treasurer. - It is
is that to equal treatment; and such treatment will be attained if either
their competitors' taxes are increased or their own reduced.2 Iowa-Des
MIoines National Bank v. Bennett, le. cit. supra note 36.
42 Cf. IowA CODE SupP. (1913) § 1330-h; Weyerhaueser v. Minnesota,
176 U. S. 550, 20 Sup. Ct. 485 (1900); White River Lumber Company
v. Arkansas, 279 U. S. 692, 49 Sup. Ct. 457 (1929).
43 Mandamus is an equitable action in Iowa. IOWA CODE Sun'. (1913)
§ 4341.
-"Ridley v. Doughty, County Auditor, 85 Iowa 418, 52 N. W. 330 (1892);
cf. People v. Ashbury, 44 Cal. 616 (1872) ; State v. State Board of Equaliza-
tion of Montana, 67 Mont. 340, 215 Pac. 667 (1923); State v. Raine,
Auditor, 47 Ohio St. 447, 25 N. E. 54 (1890); State v. Covington, Auditor,
35 S. C. 245, 14 S. E. 499 (1892); State v. Herrald, Commissioner, 36
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also widely true, and it was true in Iowa at the time in ques-
tion, that mandamus is by no means a remedy available to gov-
ernment officials only.45 On the contrary where a public duty
is to be enforced a tax-payer and citizen may usually employ
it without showing any peculiar personal interest.40 In the ex-
pansion and improvement of this instrument, whether by legis-
lation or adjudication or both, lie possibilities of substantial im-
provements in the administration of taxing measures. Had the
courts in the Iowa-Des M~oines Bank case seen fit to work out
their problem in some such measure, an undesirable tendency
to foreclose discussion of such methods might have been checked.
And since the action was to recover money paid to the state
many years ago, a result might simultaneously have been reached
more harmonious, perhaps, with these difficult days of unem-
ployment relief and insolvent cities and states.
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND
THE SCOPE OF STATUTORY IMMUNITY
ORIGINATING as a rule of evidence to prevent the extraction of
forced testimony,' the ancient common law privilege against self-
incrimination found sanction in the Federal Constitution,2 and in
all the state constitutions but two. 3  Not until the rise of gov-
W. Va. 721, 15 S. E. 794 (1892). In the principal case the auditor had
power, given in permissive words, to correct the tax list. IOWA CODE
Surp. (1913) § 1385-b. The Ridley case, supra, was decided under a
statute containing similar phrases. 1 IowA CODE (1888) § 841. It was
held that a mandatory duty was imposed thereby. Cf. State v. Ratne,
Auditor, supra.
45 "The order of mandamus is granted on the petition of any private
party aggrieved, without the concurrence of the prosecutor for the state
* when the public interest is concerned . . ." IOWA CODE (1919) § 8235.
. Case v. Blood, 71 Iowa 632, 33 N. W. 144 (1887) ; State v. Judge of
Marshall County, 7 Iowa 186 (1858); State v. Bailey, 7 Iowa 390 (1858);
People v. Board of Supervisors of Gallatin County, 294 Ill. 579, 128 N.
E. 645 (1920); People v. Czasewicz, 295 Ill. 11, 128 N. E. 139 (1920);
Garrison v. City of Laurens, 55 S. C. 551, 33 S. E. 577 (1899); Harrison
v. Banksdale, 127 Va. 180, 102 S. E. 789 (1920); Zigler v. Sprinkel, 131
Va. 408, 108 S. E. 656 (1921); of. Felt v. Waughop, 193 Cal. 498, 225
Pac. 862 (1924); State Text-Book Commission v. Weathers, 184 Ky. 748,
213 S. W. 207 (1919).
14 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2250.
2 "No person ... shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witnosg
against himself.. .." U. S. CONSTITUTION, 5th AMENDMENT.
3 4 WIGMOnEP, EVIDENCE § 2252, note 3. Iowa and New Jersey recognize
the privilege as part of their common law. State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650,
91 N. W. 935 (1902); State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N. J. L. 620, 55 Atl. 743
(1903).
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ernmental regulation of private enterprise, 4 however, was there
occasion for its constitutional interpretation and delimitationY
Hampered in its combat with super-trusts and conspiracies in
restraint of trade unless alleged conspirators could be made to
talk, the Federal Congress enacted provisions compelling such
testimony and granting immunity from prosecution therefor0
The Supreme Court held these provisions valid and compelling
only when the immunity given was coextensive with the priv-
ilege for which it was substituted; 7 and thus was raised a ques-
tion which is still troublesome, whether complete immunity from
federal prosecution is sufficient to compel testimony incriminat-
ing under the laws of a state, against whose criminal processes
no immunity can be extended by federal enactment." For it has
long since been settled that the Fifth Amendment applies only
to proceedings in federal courts, and does not protect the indi-
vidual in his capacity as a citizen of the state.0 Under the fur-
ther ruling by the Supreme Court that the privilege is not part
of the fundamental law of the land protected from abridgment
by the states,"" these latter sovereignties are free to interpret
the privilege without fear of federal review under the due
process clause of either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.
But they in turn are faced with the converse problem of whether
immunity conferred by the state is sufficient to compel testimony,
although it cannot protect against federal prosecution.1 '
Any determination of the extent of the privilege necessarily
involves a balancing of its disadvantage in the prosecution of
crime as against the benefit which it affords in protecting the
liberty of the individual.- Despite an increasing tendency to
limit its sphere of application,'2 it is argued that the privilege
4 David E. Lilienthal, The Power of GovernmZcntal Agencies to Compel
Testimony (1926) 39 HARv. L. R.v. 694.
5 Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court's Constretion of the Self-
Incrimination Clavse (1930) 29 MICH. L. REV. 191, 192.
627 STAT. 443 (1893), 49 U. S. C. § 46 (1926) ; 32 STAT. 904 (1903), 49
U. S. C. § 47 (1926).
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 12 Sup. Ct. 195 (1892);
Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 16 Sup. Ct. 644 (1896).
- Corwin, op. cit. supra note 5, at 197; Note (1896) 10 Hv. L. Rnv.
120; (1925) 38 HARV. L. REV. 389.
9 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U. S. 1833); Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14 (1908).
10 Twining v. New Jersey, supra note 9; Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372,
26 Sup. Ct. 73 (1905); see Corwin, op. cit. szlpra note 5, at 202.
' "Cf. United States v. Smith, 51 F. (2d) 803 (S. D. Ten. 1931), noted in
(1932) 30 MiCH. L. REv. 461.
24 WIcmoRE, EvnDENcE § 2284. Cf. the adoption by West Virginia of
Wigmore's suggestion that immunity be authorized in all crimes without
exception by a single statutory section. OFFiCiAL Conir OF W. VA. (1931)
c. 57, art. 5, § 2.
13 4 WI GLmo § 2251; and ibid. 934-954, for complete list of immunity
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itself is necessary to guard against the unlicensed extortiQn of
testimony which may ensue in its absence.14 But in these days
of legislative committee'-' and judicial grand jurylo inquiries
into governmental administration, when evidence is exceedingly
difficult to obtain unless disclosures may be compelled, state and
federal legislatures have felt it highly desirable to abrogate the
privilege in many instances,'1 and they have not considered
statutory amnesty for past crimes too high a price to pay for
valuable information.18 And where the witness attempts to
maintain silence, thus protecting his accomplices as well as him-
self, on the ground of possible incrimination under the laws of a
foreign jurisdiction, some courts have felt constrained, in fur-
therance of the legislative purpose, to declare that the privilege
is limited to dangers arising under the laws of the local sov-
ereignty.
In the light of conflicting Supreme Court decisions the ques-
tion has been regarded as an open one in the inferior federal
courts.19 While the Court, relying on the authority of a very
early case,2 0 once held that a witness may refuse to testify where
to do so would expose him to prosecution under state laws,21 it
has more consistently ruled that complete immunity within the
jurisdiction in which the witness is examined is sufficient, on
the theory that the danger of foreign prosecution is too remote
statutes; William H. Taft, The Administration of Crinzinal Latw (1905)
15 YALE L. J. 1; Henry T. Terry, Constitutional Provisions Against Foreing
Self-Incrimination (1906) 15 YALE; L. J. 127.
14 4 WIGMORE § 2251, at p. 823.
1s New York Times, Aug. 28, 1931, at 1.
16 Ibid., Nov. 20, at 22.
7 lSuprra note 13.
is "Congress, and the legislatures of many states, have enacted im-
munity statutes for the purpose of securing conviction for such offenses,
as gambling, briber, the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors,
usury, combinations in restraint of trade, and like offenses, in which
two or more persons participate to constitute the crime, the necessities
of the case, and the difficulty of obtaining witnesses to establish the offense,
punish the offenders, and suppress the crime, being deemed sufficient to
warrant the extending of immunity to a participant in order to constitute
him a competent witness against the other offenders." State v. Jack, 69
Kans. 387, 396, 76 Pac. 911, 914 (1904); aff'd 199 U. S. 372, 26 Sup. Ct.
73 (1905).
19 See Vajtauer v. Immigration Comm'r, 273 U. S. 103, 113, 47 Sup.
Ct. 302, 306 (1927); In re Doyle, 42 F. (2d) 686, 688 (S. D. N. Y,
1930) ; Note (1931) 17 VA. L. REv. 285.
20 U. S. v. Saline Bank, 1 Pet. 100 (U. S. 1828) (distinguished in Halo
v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 69, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 377 (1906) on ground that
the federal court was merely proceeding under state law which provided
the penalty, and that consequently no question arose as to a prosecution
under another jurisdiction).
21 Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U. S. 186, 26 Sup. Ct. 212 (1905).
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and unsubstantial to be material. In Brown v. Wc.lkcr, 22 the
danger was factually considered and held too remote by a five to
four decision.23 But in a later case2- this doctrine was extended
to incorporate what was supposed to be the English rule: that
as a nmtter of law the danger of prosecution under the laws of
a foreign jurisdiction is too remote and unsubstantial to be con-
sidered, since in passing upon the claim of privilege the court
cannot well know the laws of the other sovereignty or the danger
of prosecution thereunder.- 5 The recent Supreme Court decision
in United States v. Murdock,"O adopting the latter view without
mention of the former, would seem, however, to settle the matter
for the federal courts. But under our federal system of govern-
ment this danger seems substantial enough .27 The Supreme
Court has held that prosecution by the state courts, based on
the same act or transaction which constitutes a similar offense
against the federal government, will not bar federal prosecution
therefor.-  And the danger of double prosecution for a different
offense, whether or not it be based on the same act or transac-
tion, is even more imminent.
The recent entanglement of Dr. Doyle, New York veterinarian,
with both federal and state authorities, specifically illustrates the
possibility. Accused of violation of the federal income tax laws,
Doyle refused to testify before a grand jury in regard to the
2 Supra note 7.
23 In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Shiras took issue squarely on
this point. "It is urged that . . . such a jeopardy is too remote to be con-
sidered. The force of this contention is not perceived. On the contrary such
is the nature of the commerce which is controlled by the interstate com-
merce law, so intimately involved are the movements of trade and trans-
portation. . . that just such questions as those which are now considered
may be naturally ep\Tected to frequently arise." 161 U. S. at 625, 16 Sup.
Ct. at 662.
24 Hale v. Henkel, supra note 20.
25 The King of Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 301 (1851). The
doctrine is summed up and approved in 4 WIGMI~AG § 2258. But cf. note
43 infra. And see U. S. v. McRae, L. R. 4 Eq. 327, 336, 3 Ch. App. 79, 85
(1867), in which Lord Chancellor Chelmsford said of Lord Cranworth's
judgment in the Two Sicilies case, "It was unnecessary to lay down so
broad a proposition to support the judgment which he pronounced, and
he certainly could not have contemplated a case where the presumed
ignorance of the Judge as to foreign law is completely removed by the
admitted statements upon the pleadings, in which the exact nature of
the penalty or forfeiture incurred by the party objecting to answer is
precisely stated." But of. In re Atherton, 2 I. B. 251 (1912) (privilege
denied, with no citation of authority for or against). See also, Power v.
Ellis, 6 Can. Sup. 1, 6 (1881) (undecided).
26 52 Sup. Ct. 63 (1931).
-7D. 0. McGovney, Self-Criminating Testinty Code Revision Bill
(1920) 5 IowA L. BUL. 174, 182-184; New York Times, Dec. 11, 1931,
at 2, col 3.
28 U. S. v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 43 Sul3. Ct. 141 (1922).
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splitting of fees earned by him in his practice before the New
York Board of Standards and Appeals, on the ground that it
would incriminate him under a New York law making it a penal
offense to bribe public officials. The court affirmed the priv-
ilege,219 since federal immunity could not protect him in the state
courts. A year later, Doyle, subpoenaed by the Hofstadter com-
mittee, refused to answer similar questions on the ground that
it would incriminate him under the federal income tax laws,
The Court of Appeals of New York denied the privilege," citing
Jack v. Kansas3 1 to the effect that the danger of prosecution was
too remote. However, the collaborative action by the represen-
tatives of the federal and state authorities in nolprossing a pend-
ing federal indictment in anticipation of Doyle's claim of foreign
incrimination, 32 seems to indicate the real and substantial char-
acter of the danger involved.
Since federal courts take judicial notice of the public laws of
all the states,33 and, conversely, states must take judicial notice
of federal laws,84 there is no difficulty in discovering these
foreign laws. Curiously enough, however, while the lower fed-
eral courts have acted unanimously in permitting the witness
to reject the statutory immunity and rely on the privilege where
incrimination under state laws would otherwise ensue,0 the state
courts have not attained such unanimity where incrimination
under federal laws is involved, 0 although in a few cases where
29 In re Doyle, supra note 19.
30 Doyle v. Hofstadter, 257 N. Y. 244, 177 N. E. 489, 497 (1931).
"Supra note 10; Note (1906) 15 YALE L. J. 234; Note (1906) 19 -1AIM
L. REv. 299.
32 New York'Times, July 17, 1931, at 1.
IP Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. 242 (1885); Lane v.
Sargent, 217 Fed. 237 (C. C. A. 1st, 1914).
34 Baltimord & Ohio S. W. R. R. v. Berdon, 195 Ind. 265, 145 N. V. 2
(1924); Metropolitan 'Stock Exchange v. Lyndonville National Bank, 76
Vt. 303, 57 Atl. 101 (1904) ; U. S. CONSTITUTION, Art. VI.
35 In re Nachman, 114 Fed. 995 (D. S. C. 1902) ; In re 1Xanter, 117 Fed.
356 (S. D. N. Y. 1902); In re Hooks Smelting Company, 138 Fed. 954
(E. D. Pa. 1905) ; In re Doyle, supra note 19; see Buckeye 'Powder Com-
pany v. Hazard Powder Company, 205 Fed. 827, 829 (D. Conn. 1913); 0/.
In re Scott, 95 Fed. 815 (W. D. Pa. 1899); In re Feldstein, 103 Fed. 2069
(S. D. N. Y. 1900); U. S. v. Lombardo, 228 Fed. 980 (W. D. Wash.
1915) aff"d (on another ground) 241 U. S. 73, 36 ISup. Ct. 508 (1916),
Note (1916) 29 HARv. L. Ray. 876; In re Gasteiger, 290 Fed. 410 (E. D.
N. Y. 1923); In re Hess, 134 Fed. 109 (E. D. Pa. 1905).
36 Privilege denied: People v. Butler St. Foundry & Iron Company, 201
Ill. 236, 66 N. E. 349 (1903); State v. Jack, supra note 18; Dunham v.
Ottinger, 243 N. Y. 423, 154 N. E. 298 (1926); Doyle v. Hofstadtor, sapra
note 30; see Ex Parte Copeland, 91 Tex. Crim. Rep. 549, 240 S. W. 314
(1922). Privilege affirmed: People v. Nussbaum, 55 App. Div. 245, 67
N. Y. Supp. 492 (3d Dep't 1900); cf. State v. Verecker, 124 Ite. 178, 180,
.126 Atl. 827, 828 (1924): "We are of the opinion that comity between the
United States and state courts should be observed to the fullest oxtent
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the state courts have denied the privilege, they have endeavored
to restrict the testimony to intastdte transactions which would
not include any disclosures of federal offenses,3 a procedure
naturally impossible in federal proceedings.
On the other hand, where the claim of privilege is made in a
state court on the ground of incrimination under the laws of
another state, it is universally denied.
32 But here also there is
no difficulty in discovering the foreign law, since some states
have statutes authorizing their courts to take judicial notice of
the laws of sister states,39 and all permit proof by proper authen-
tication.40 Moreover the danger of interstate rendition threatens
the witness in a real and substantial way. 1
In the only case discovered in which the claim was made in a
state or federal coult on the ground of incrimination under the
laws of a foreign country, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts held that the only danger to be considered was that
arising under the laws of ]Mlassachusetts 2 In view of the fact,
however, that the court took judicial notice that there existed
no treaty of extradition between the Republic of Greece and the
United States, the declaration of such a rule may be said to have
been superfluous in the face of the factual remoteness of the
danger.
Limitation of the privilege against self-incrimination to pro-
tection from dangers arising under the laws of the forum causes
great reluctance to testify in the more usual case of a person
who is innocent under those laws, but who has sinned against the
laws of a second jurisdiction. 3 There is also the possibility of
-when the question of immunity is properly made an issue in the state
court, and that statutes of immunity should be given the broadest appliea-
tion."
37 People v. Butler St. Foundry & Iron Company, supma note 36; State
v. Jack, supra note 18.
38 State v. March, 1 Jones (N. C.) 526 (1854) ; State v. Thomas, 98 N. C.
599 (1887) (reluctant approval of State v. March, although decision was
preferably placed on a different ground of waiver); In re Werner, 167
App. Div. 384, 152 N. Y. Supp. 862 (1st Dep't 1915) ; In re Cappeau, 198
App. Div. 357, 190 N. Y. Supp. 452 (1st Dep't 1921), noted in (1922) 22
COL. L. REV. 282; State v. Wood, 99 Vt. 490, 134 AtI. 697 (1926); Note
(1927) 40 HnRv. L. REV. 657.
39 Darling v. Dent, 82 Ark. 76, 100 S. W. 747 (1907). See Note (1922)
21 MICH. L. REV. 223; O7 ciL CODE OF W. VA. (1931) c. 57, art. 1, § 4.
40 U- S. CONSTITUTION, Art. IV § 1; 1 STAT. 122 (1790), 28 U. S. C.
§ 687 (1926).
41 Ibid., Art. IV. § 2.
42 Republic of Greece v. Aristides Koukouras, 264 Mass. 318i, 162 N. E.
345 (1928).
43 "The witness-stand is today sufficiently a place of annoyance and
dread. The reluctance to enter it must not be increased. Every influence
which tends to suppress the sources of truth must be removed. To remove
all the limits of inquiry into the secrets of the persons who have no stake
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a nullification of the privilege by collaborative action on the part
of federal and state attorneys, whereby, for instance, a state at-
torney may call for a grand jury inquiry, with no hope of
obtaining an indictment under state laws, merely for the purpose
of bringing to light relevant testimony which may serve to effect
a federal indictment.
Yet in the Murdock case, all these considerations indicating
the substantial nature of the burden placed upon the witness
were apparently outweighed by the exigencies of governmental
investigation. The extreme complexity of modern business oper-
ations requires that every investigatory weapon be placed at the
disposal of the state. And as these requirements make them-
selves more keenly felt it may not be surprising to see still
further limitations placed upon the ancient privilege against
self-incrimination.
in the cause but can furnish help in its investigation, would be to add
to the motives which now sufficiently dispose them to evade their duty."
4 WIGmoRE, § 2251, at 822.
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